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Abstract
This thesis is a study of neutrality, as a foreign policy,
as practiced by Finland and Ireland, and of the constraints that
limit the scope of neutrality as a foreign policy.
Ireland's
neutrality is affected by its close relationship with the Western
powers.
Finland's neutrality is modified by its position next to
the Soviet Union. The simple distribution of power does not
allow either Ireland or Finland to practice a classical neu
trality, as does Switzerland.
Furthermore, the forces of
domestic political competition and maintenance of sovereignty,
also color the formulation of these states' foreign policies.
By
analyzing these three forces, distribution of power, domestic
political competition, and maintenance of sovereignty, while
historically comparing Irish and Finnish foreign policy, we can
describe and understand neutrality better.

A Historical Comparison of
Irish and Finnish Neutrality

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare and explain the neu
tralities of Finland and the Republic of Ireland, hereafter
referred to simply as Ireland.

The method of explanation will

set the neutrality of these two countries in the context of
constraints.

That is, neutrality is the chosen foreign policy of

Ireland and Finland because it has been the most efficacious
course to follow in light of the constraints which bind them.
Because of concerns for state integrity, the distribution of
power, and the high political value assigned to staying out of
great power conflicts, neutrality is used by the two states to
accommodate the constraints which limit their options in foreign
policy.
The method used to compare the forms of neutrality practiced
by Ireland and Finland is a chronological one, introduced by a
general overview of each country as it stands presently.

Then,

the development of Irish and Finnish neutrality will be examined
from the emergence of each as a sovereign state to the present.
At intervals which signal a change in the importance of the con
straining elements, an analysis of the two neutralities to that
point will be given, and then the comparison will recommence.
Neutrality in a modern sense is a difficult concept to
define, let alone practice.

A neutral state must not start wars

or belong to a military alliance.

A neutral state must provide

for a credible military deterrent, to prevent the transgression

-
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of its territory by belligerents.

A neutral must follow the

current guidelines of international law as it applies to
neutrals.

A neutral must profess to be neutral and practice a

foreign policy which will not allow it to be drawn into conflict.
Finally, a neutral must not aid militarily, economically,
politically, or otherwise, belligerent states, though economic
and political intercourse may continue.1
Unfortunately, in the modern world the distinction between
war and peace has become increasingly difficult to determine.
For example, the complexities of international trade are such
that the origins of some strategic materials are hard to deter
mine, which complicates the verification of aid to
states by neutrals.

belligerent

Furthermore, what does and does not

constitute a neutral foreign policy is not universally agreed.
Today Ireland and Finland profess to be neutral and are
considered neutral by much of the rest of the world.

However,

neither country is as purely neutral as Switzerland, which
established its neutrality in an 1815 treaty.

Austria, in 1955,

also achieved international treaty recognition of its neutrality.
But in both cases, the Austrian and the Swiss, foreign policy
prerogatives were sacrificed to obtain international recognition
of their neutrality.
Ireland and Finland have retained most of their foreign
policy prerogatives and this adds to the uncertainty about the
1 Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in
the 19801s (Dublin:
Institute of Public Administration, 1984)
p. 3.
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The Austrians and Swiss are bound

by international law to remain neutral, which is not the case
with either Ireland or Finland, and it remains in the hands of
the Irish and Finnish policymakers to establish versions of
neutrality which enable the two countries to stay out of great
power conflict without sacrificing their sovereignty or inde
pendence in foreign policy.
Presently, in Finland and Ireland, neutrality enjoys a
great deal of support among the electorate and the political
elites.

An example of public support in Finland for neutrality

occurred in 1980 when former President Kekkonen attracted multi
party support from approximately 80% of the electoral college in
his bid for reelection, which was conducted on the basis of Fin
l a n d ^ successful neutrality vis a vis the Soviet Union.2

Neu

trality enjoys multi-party support in Ireland and Finland because
it safeguards the sovereignty of the two states.3
Neutrality has also afforded a framework within which to
establish the identity of the two states.

The Irish and the

Finnish manifest themselves, to some degree, in the international
arena by their neutral stances.

Helsinki, the Finnish capital,

has become an international conference center.4

For example, it

2 Brian Faloon, "Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” in Irish
Studies in International Affairs (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy,
Elso Press Ltd., 1982) p. 9.
3 Faloon, p. 11.
4 Faloon, p. 12.
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was the site of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), and the Finns and the Irish were signatories of the
resulting CSCE document known as the Helsinki Final Act.5
In the United Nations, the Finns and Irish have shared a
similar mediatory role, both having contributed heavily to United
Nations peacekeeping ventures.

In fact since 1956, the Finns

have sent 15,000 troops and the Irish 9,000 to man United Nations
peacekeeping ventures in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia.6

Both Ireland and Finland have ex

hibited a sympathy for Third World concerns in General Assembly
voting, as one would expect of states which have only recently
achieved sovereignty after centuries of great power control.7
Neutrality allows them the latitude to express their
the Third World.

Were

sympathy for

either bound by a military alliance to

one

of the great powers, it would temper its stance on Third World
issues in the General Assembly and elsewhere rather than injure
its relationship with the great power.
Nonetheless, the distribution of power does effect Ireland
and Finland, and their attachment to neutrality, with varying
degrees of similarity.

Both of these countries lie within the

scope of great power influence.
Great Britain, is also

Ireland, which is a

within the area of the United

5 Faloon, p. 13.
6 Keatinge, p. 50.
7 Keatinge, pp. 52-53.

neighbor to
States'

-

(US) power projection.
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With 3.3 million inhabitants, it is 1/3

as big and 1/20 as populated as Great Britain.8

It is dependent

upon Great Britain for 50% of its export trade and fully 80% of
its export trade is with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) signatories.9
Ireland spends less per capita than any neutral in Europe on
defense, apparently indebting it to the West, and more speci
fically to NATO and the US, for its military security.10
It is not surprising, therefore, that Ireland, while not
always a practitioner of solidarity with the West in the United
Nations, is clearly tied by the distribution of power to a proWest neutrality.11
Its great neighbor, the Soviet Union, exerts a similar in
fluence over Finland, albeit with more of an emphasis place on
defense considerations.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation

and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed in 1948 by the Soviets and
the Finns binds the survival of Finnish sovereignty, and
correspondingly the success of Finnish neutrality, to Soviet
security from advances from the West, most specifically
Germany.12

In its preamble, the FCMA acknowledges, "Finlands

8 Keatinge, p. 77
9 Keatinge, p. 47.
10 Keatinge, p. 42.
11 Keatinge, p. 38.
12 Faloon, p. 9.
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desire to remain out of the conflicting interests of the Great
Powers.”13

However, the FCMA requires consultations between the

parties if an aggression directed at the Soviet Union has the
potential of using Finland as a route into Soviet territory.
Moreover, if a belligerent act aimed at both the Soviets and the
Finns seems imminent, the Soviets have the right to transport
troops through Finland in order to assist the Finns in the
maintenance of their territorial integrity and neutrality.14
The FCMA is both a hindrance and a support to Finnish neu
trality.

It certainly reflects the awesome military power of the

Soviet Union and highlights what the Soviets can do to Finnish
territorial integrity if they see fit.

If taken literally, it

would destroy any claim the Finns have to neutrality.

It is

clearly a military alliance in time of war because it commits the
Finns to allowing Soviet troop transport through their territory,
and to a co-belligerency with the Red Army.

But the FCMA is the

lesser of two evils if one considers the fate of the Baltic
states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Their fate, total ab

sorption into the Soviet empire, would have befallen Finland had
the FCMA not acknowledged Soviet power and guaranteed the Soviets

13 The Preamble of the Agreement of Friendship. Co-operation
and Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Finland and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Signed on April 6. 1948. in
Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Westport,
Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1975) p. 280.
14 Articles 1 & 2 of the Agreement of Friendship. Co
operation and Mutual Assistance, in Mazour, pp. 280-281.
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a benevolent Finnish neutrality.15
The strength of Finnish neutrality has been demonstrated by
the fact that the FCMA has not been activated.

In order to pro

tect their sovereignty the Finns opted to not join the Warsaw
Pact, despite Soviet Invitation.

But with a bow to Soviet

power, the Finns also elected not to join NATO, for this would
have initiated the FCMA by the Soviets.

Both Finnish nonparti

cipation in the Warsaw Pact, and nonparticipation in NATO were
tolerated because of the FCMA.16
Forced by geographical realities to serve as a buffer state
between East and West, but forced by diplomatic realities to stay
out of power blocs, the Finns have moved to assert their neu
trality by arming themselves handily, thus making the transgres
sion of Finnish territory a potentially unpleasant experience.
In contrast to Ireland, which can mobilize 1.1% of its population
in time of war, the Finns can muster 15.3%.17

The Finns have a

viable army, air force and navy which are equipped with modern
weapons purchased from the East and West.18

But with only 4.7

million inhabitants and the 5th largest land area in Europe, they
15 Faloon, p. 5.
16 Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish
Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hugh Evelyn
Ltd., 1968) p. 58.
17 Keatinge, p. 42.
18 Aimo Pajanen, "Some Aspects of Finnish Security," in
Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe, eds. Karl Birnbaum &
Hans Neuhold (Wein: Wilhelm Braumuller, Universitats Verlagsbuch
Handlung Gesellschaft, 1982) p. 161.

have a big job of defense.
and Ireland combined.

Finland is bigger than Great Britain

However, the Finns are well equipped and

have a strong military history, and it is due, in part, to their
military history that the Soviets have respected Finland's claim
to neutrality, though the smaller country possesses only 2% of
the population and 1/2% of the land mass of its larger neighbor.19
Finally, the domestic political frameworks of Finland and
Ireland predispose them to neutrality.

They are both modern,

industrialised, northern European states, but each was dominated
by its larger neighbor for centuries and only achieved
independence in the years following World War I.20

Both

countries were inclined to neutrality at their births, due to
Ireland's reluctance to fight British wars and Finland's
tradition of partial foreign policy autonomy during its period as
a Russian Grand Duchy.21
Ireland shares with Great Britain the Westminster form of
government, a common literary heritage and language, and a
larger, more general, cultural bond.22
the US.

It also has close ties to

Fully 40 million Americans claim whole or partial Irish

19 Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Westport,
Connecticut:
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975) pp. 1-2.
20 Jakobson, p. 3 and Alan Ward, The Easter Rising:
Revolution and Irish Nationalism (Arlington Heights, Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, 1980) p. 142.
21 Ward, p. 151 and Mazour, pp. 12-13.
22 Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History.
1922 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1985) p. 166.
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Why, then, is it not a member of the Western
The answer lies in the separation of the six northern

counties in Ireland from the southern twenty-six.

At this time,

a military alliance with Great Britain is heresy in Irish
politics due to the presence of British troops and the British
government in the six counties of Northern Ireland.

However,

the Irish, like the Finns, have strayed close to compromising
their neutrality.

As the FCMA would destroy Finnish neutrality

if enacted, Irish membership in the European Community could
damage Irish neutrality, due to the economic and political
responsibilities it entails for its signatories, such as joint
economic sanctions during hostilities.24
Currently, neutrality is parroted without opposition in the
Irish Parliament, though it may be true that the neutrality of a
member of the Labour Party is quite different from that of Dr.
Fitzgerald of Fine Gael or Mr. Haughey of Fianna Fail.25 How
ever, neutrality is likely to remain a cornerstone of Irish
foreign policy as long as it continues to keep Ireland out of a
military alliance while affording it the flexibility to derive
the economic benefits of European Community membership.
Finland also had
but unlike the Irish,

a border dispute

with its

who use theseparation

larger neighbor,

of the north

and the

south as a pretext for remaining out of NATO, the Finns make no
23 Keatinge, p. 95.
24 Keatinge, pp.

84-85.

25 Keatinge, pp.

116-117.
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Control of the territory of Karelia, the

mythological birthplace of the first Finns and the home of a
large Finnish ethnic minority until the end of World War II, was
disputed by the Finnish and Soviet governments and was a justifi
cation for hostilities with the Soviet Union in World War II.26
But the border dispute was resolved at the end of World War II
with the extrication of the Finnish minority from the USSR and
their resettlement in Finland.

This would be comparable to

solving the Northern Ireland problem by resettling of the
northern Irish Catholics in the south, if Ireland's leadership
were to abandon hopes of reclaiming the northern six counties.
However, unlike the Irish, the Finns could not exist with a
border dispute with their infinitely more powerful, and more
aggressive, neighbor.

While the nonsettlement of the border

dispute symbolizes Irish dreams of reunification, and neces
sitates Irish independence from Great Britain in foreign policy,
the resolution of the Karelian issue is an example of the aware
ness by Finns that neutrality and sovereignty cannot coexist with
confrontation with the Soviets.
Unlike Ireland, Finland is not a relative geopolitical back
water and, as a consequence, Finnish Lapland separates the NATO
forces from the Warsaw Pact, and to the south, whoever controls
the Aaland Islands, as Napoleon remarked, holds a pistol aimed at
the heart of Sweden.27
26

Mazour, p. 179.

27 Jakobson, p. 9.

It was because of Finland's strategic

-
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importance that the Germans passed through its territory in 1918
and 1941 to engage the Soviets.28

International relations there

fore assumes a high profile in the Finnish political arena.
The Finnish presidential-prime minister system of government
is similar to the current French arrangement in the 5th Republic.
As in France, it is the president who is paramount in foreign
policy.

It is he who must construct or protect a neutrality

which both mollifies the Soviet Union and enables the Finns to
hold onto their thoroughly Western, or more accurately, Scan
dinavian ideological preferences and socio-economic organiza
tions.29

The so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, named for

Finland's first two post World War II presidents, has become the
basis of Finnish foreign policy and it is the rock upon which
Soviet trust in Finland

is placed.30

taken seriously within the

As such,

ifone is

to

be

Finnishpoliticalspectrum, one must

support and adhere to this policy.31
As is evident from this introduction, neither Finland nor
Ireland is wholly neutral, nor is neutrality an end in itself.
Rather, neutrality bends and folds to the demands placed on it by
the European Community, the FCMA, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union, respectively.
28 Jakobson, p. 54.
29 Faloon, p. 11.
30 Faloon, p. 11.
31 John VIoyantes, Silk Glove Hegemony:
Finnish Soviet
Relations. 1944-74 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1975)
p. 80.

Chapter 1
"The Struggle to Establish a Neutral Foreign Policy
After Independence"
Irish neutrality evolved as a means for the Irish to main
tain their independence from Great Britain.

The Irish separatist

and home rule movements of the late 19th century were not
enamoured with the prospect of fighting any more wars on behalf
of the British empire.

As a result, Irish nonparticipation in,

and opposition to, the Boer War was an early form of Irish
neutrality, and of its symbolic importance to Irish independence
from Great Britain.32
Irish opposition to conscription in World War I was headed
by separatists, including, Roger Casement and James Connolly, and
the British did not attempt to impose conscription in Ireland
until 1918, when the idea was met with massive resistance and
abandoned.33

The Irish war of independence, from 1919 to 1921,

added to the likelihood that the Irish would opt for a separate
identity in international relations because many who opposed
Irish participation in World War I also fought for Irish inde
pendence .
But however much the Irish would have wanted to cut their
ties with their powerful neighbor, complete separation from Great
32 Ward, pp. 43-45.
33 Raymond James Raymond, "Irish Neutrality:
Ideology or
Pragmatism?" International Affairs. Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 19831984) p. 31.
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Britain was an economic and cultural impossibility.

The bonds of

common language, political systems, and for centuries, the same
head of state and head of government, had firmly cemented the
link between the two countries.

Moreover, British trade sus

tained the Irish economy.
Before Ireland was formally recognized as an independent
state, the Irish Free State, in 1922, the Anglo-Irish Treaty
of December 1921 had granted the British naval port facilities at
the Irish ports of Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly.34

At the

time, Britain considered these facilities important to protect
convoy travel between the US and Britain, and provide security
for Britain's western flank in time of war.
During the 1920's it became evident that although the cen
turies old attachment of Ireland to Great Britain would not end,
it would be diminished by Irish independence.

Ireland was,

after all, still a part of the Commonwealth, if in a diminished
capacity.

In 1927, the Minister for External Affairs, Desmond

FitzGerald, noted that if Great Britain was ever the target of
belligerency, the Irish would come to its aid.35

And when the

election of 1932 brought Fianna Fail to power, Taoiseach Eamon de
Valera asserted that Great Britain and Ireland had a unique re
lationship, and in time of conflict Ireland would show special

34 Keatinge, p. 16.
35 Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among Nations:
Issues of Irish
Foreign Policy (Dublin:
Institute of Public Administration,
1978), p. 84.
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consideration to its neighbor.36
It was during the 1930's that de Valera, watching League of
Nation sanctions against Italy fail, turned away from the notion
of collective security embodied by the League and decided upon a
more isolationist and neutral policy to protect Irish
interests.37
be neutral.38

In 193 6 he told Dail Eirann that Ireland wished to
The 1938 Anglo-Irish Treaty therefore removed

British claims to Irish ports.

Britain had decided that the

ports were no longer vital to British security, and were becoming
an unnecessary luxury because of the ill will provoked by main
taining a British presence in Ireland.39
As the storm gathered which would become World War II, with
the German annexation of the Sudetenland and the Wehrmacht's
rapid mobilization, Europe became restive.
would be no "peace for our time."

It was clear there

In 1939, the First Lord of the

Admiralty, Winston Churchill, inquired if Ireland would regrant
Britain rights to the Irish Defense Ports.
the Irish.40

De Valera determined that

was to steer clear of the battle on the

This was refuted by

the bestpath for
Continent, and

able to assert Irish independence in doing so.

Ireland
he was

Irish neutrality

36 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations. p. 86.
37 Robert Fisk, In Time of War:
Ireland. Ulster and the
Price of Neutrality. 1939-45 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983) p. 59.
38 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p.

14.

39 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p.

16.

40 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 89.
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in World War II was de Valera's successful attempt to keep
Ireland out of the conflict while promoting a sense of Irish
nationalism through the exercise of an independent foreign
policy.
De Valera was also to find a policy of neutrality expedient
for his party, Fianna Fail, which had opposed the partition of
Ireland in 1921 and had fought a civil war over the issue.

He

claimed that Ireland could not take part in a war as Britain's
ally so long as the northern six counties were occupied by
British forces.41

Partition gave de Valera the political issue

necessary to unite the Dail under his leadership, for no party
was willing to sanction partition by actively and overtly
abandoning neutrality, which would be the consequence of siding
with Great Britain.
Moreover de Valera felt he had no choice but to remain above
the conflict.

He felt that civil war was possible if the govern

ment were to conscript Irishmen to fight in Britain's war.42
Simply stated, neutrality was the one policy de Valera could
adopt which would unite the nation under his leadership, and
force Britain to accept Ireland's sovereignty.43

This last point

was evidenced by the British decision to accept the Irish refusal

41 Fisk, p. 382.
42 Fisk, p. 250.
43 Fisk, p. 250.
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on the defense ports and its nonparticipation in the war.44
When British inquiries were later made to the Minister of
Defense, Frank Aiken, to determine if Ireland would commit itself
to the Allies in return for a deferred reunification of the
Island, they were turned down.45

Britain had once deferred Irish

home rule, during World War I, and the Irish leadership was not
willing to be taken advantage of a second time, especially since
it was doubtful that the northern Protestants would agree to any
such deal involving their separation from British rule.

When it

was noted, somewhat bitterly, that British lives were lost as a
result of his policy toward the defense ports, de Valera replied
that many Irish lives were spared by the same act.46
This is not at all to intimate that the Irish had reneged
on their promise to show the British a special consideration if
it were the object of hostilities.

From the Spring of 1941 to

the end of World War II, there was an effective Irish combat
force within the British army.

A full 60,000 troops and 100,000

civilians volunteered to serve the British war effort.47

The

Irish did not let themselves fall easy prey to the Germans
either.

The Irish army during the War grew to 40,000 regulars

44 Norman MacQueen, "The Expedience of Tradition:
Ireland,
International Organization and the Falklands Crisis," Political
Studies. Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1985, p. 89.
45 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 16.
46 Fisk, p. 256.
47 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 91.
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and 100,000 reservists to meet the challenge.48
In several ways, the Irish were not wholly neutral during
the conflict.

Besides the Irish volunteers in the British army,

Ireland supplied coastal reconnaissance and weather reports to
the US and Great Britain in order to aid convoy movements.

The

Pentagon even contemplated decorating Irish military leaders
after the war for services rendered to the Allied cause.49
Irish neutrality was not, in the strict sense, complete.

So
But de

Valera had avoided sending Irish troops to battle the Nazis under
Irish colors.

He also managed to avoid a declaration of war on

Ireland by the Axis powers.

Irish neutrality during World War II

was peculiar, given the assistance rendered to the Allies by the
Irish military, but symbolically it was wholly successful,
because Ireland had demonstrated to its citizenry that it could
opt for a policy differing from that of Great Britain.
The result of neutrality on the citizenry during the war was
one of increased introspection, as Ireland sealed itself off from
most of the conflict on the Continent.

The war forced it to

become more self-sufficient, economically and politically, which
heightened the feeling among Irishmen that theirs was indeed a
viable state.

Support for neutrality became a nationalist cause

and de Valera noted during the war that straying from neutrality
would be political suicide.

By the end of the war, de Valera's

"successful neutrality" had become so accepted that it had taken
48 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 19.
49 Ibid., p. 17.
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on a dogmatic quality.50
In examining the constraints placed on Irish foreign policy
before and during the war, it becomes evident how de Valera was
able to develop neutrality and use it to pursue Irish claims on
sovereignty.

We have noted that de Valera, as head of Fianna

Fail, could not have survived politically if Ireland allied it
self with Great Britain while the northern six counties remained
beyond Dublin's domain, but Ireland's culture was intertwined
with Great Britain's and adverse to Nazism.51

The Irish could be

nothing but partial to the allied cause, which explains, partly,
the phenomenon of Irish volunteers in the British army and the
general benevolence shown to the Allies.

Simply, Irishmen were

closer to the British and Americans in their political history,
belief, and values, than to the Nazis.

And if the Irish policy

of neutrality left them out of the fray, they would still assist
the Allies in a way which would not compromise their neutrality.
The distribution of power was another factor which directed
the Irish to aid the Allies.
in a British and American sea.

Ireland was situated geographically
Had the Irish, for some insane

reason, decided to exhibit a benevolent neutrality toward, or
openly ally themselves with, the Axis powers, either the British
or the Americans would have brought this, and Ireland's sovereign
existence, to a hasty end.

50 Ibid., p. 20.
51 Fisk, p. 370.
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Likewise, the Irish need to preserve, and perhaps prove,
that their sovereignty directed them to neutrality as the only
feasible policy.

For while coming in on the Axis side would have

put this sovereignty in jeopardy, so would have openly siding
with the British.

De Valera felt that massive civil unrest would

result if he chose the latter, and this was something a young
state could ill afford, after the civil war of less than twenty
years before.
Benevolent neutrality toward the Allies gave de Valera the
means to unite the population, and aid those to whom the Irish
felt bound, without sacrificing political capital or internal
stability.

British acceptance of Irish neutrality was the payoff

for de Valera.

It proved to an international audience that

Ireland was an independent nation and that her larger neighbor
accepted this independence in a time of great consequence, when
overt Irish aid was most needed.
*

*

*

*

The origins of Finnish neutrality are remarkably similar to
those of Irish neutrality.

The Finns, until the final days of

World War I, had been a nation within a larger state.

Sweden and

Russia fought off and on for centuries to control what is now
Finland.

Under their rule, Finland existed as a semi-autonomous

entity known as a Grand Duchy.

And as a Grand Duchy, Finland was

able at times to conduct a foreign policy separate from its
imperial master.52

For example, the Finns were given special

52 Mazour, pp. 24-25.
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consideration with regard to the amount of the population
conscripted for armed service.53

Like the British in Ireland,

the Russians ruling Finland from 1809-1917 were careful, at
times, not to excite a population on which they did not have a
firm grip.
Finland achieved independence on 6 December 1917 in an
atmosphere of unrest and disorganization during the disin
tegration of the Russian empire.

Nonetheless, the new Soviet

state, which arose out of the ashes of the fallen Russia of
Nicholas, was the first to recognize Finland*s claim to
sovereignty, on 1 January 1918.54

This is not surprising con

sidering the early Bolshevik support for self-determination for
peoples formally under the rule of the czar.
Finland*s initial inclination was to avoid great power
conflicts and adopt the foreign policy common to the nations of
Scandinavia, which were neutral in varying degrees.55

However, a

civil war and a territorial dispute with the USSR did much to
unravel initial Finnish efforts at neutrality.

On 28 January

1918 a civil war commenced, with considerable great power inter
ference.

The Bolsheviks aided the Finnish reds and the Germans

aided the Finnish whites.

By the Summer of 1918 the whites,

under the command of Baron Mannerheim, had succeeded in their
encirclement of red resistance in the major southern Finnish
53 Mazour, p. 14.
54 Jakobson, p. 6.
55 Jakobson, p. 7.
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cities, which secured the victory.56
The next step for the army under Mannerheim was to expel the
remnants of German influence, which was already on the wane as a
result of Germany's weakening position in World War I.

This was

accomplished by 1919, and on 17 June 1919 Finland convened its
parliament and became a republic.57
Any hope the newly incorporated Finland had of survival
depended on the Soviet Union.

It naturally wished to keep out of

great power conflicts, the results of which had kept her under
Swedish and Russian domination for hundreds of years.

A credible

neutrality policy was therefore sought; but credibility takes
time to achieve, and the declaration of neutrality made by the
new republic in 1919 was regarded with skepticism in the Kremlin.58
Not only had the victorious forces under Baron Mannerheim re
ceived assistance from the Germans, but the Finns had not
renounced their claims to Soviet Karelia, the mythological birth
place of the earliest Finns.59

The Soviets had valid security

reasons for retaining Karelia, because it formed Leningrad's
suburbs.

The impasse over Soviet Karelia, and the German

influence in Finland from 1918-9, slowed Finnish rapprochement
with the USSR during the 1920's.
The 1930's brought a change in Finno-Soviet relations as the
56 Mazour, p. 44.
57 Mazour, p. 61.
58 Faloon, p. 3.
59 Mazour, p. 139.
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Soviets watched with concern the rise of facism in Germany and
took steps to secure their borders.

In 1932, the Finns signed a

Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviets, and in 1935 reiterated
their desire not to be included in great power conflict, a signal
to the Germans and the Soviets that this time the nonviolability
of Finnish soil should be respected.60
On 2 September 1939 the Finns issued another statement of
neutrality after the Germans rolled into Poland, following their
consolidation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.61

The Baltic

states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, quickly capitulated to
Soviet security demands and the Finns were confronted with a
similar demand on 5 October 1939.62

They rejected the Soviet

offer of "protection" from Germany on the grounds that it
violated Finnish neutrality and most assuredly would result in
future Soviet domination.

As a consequence, the Soviets claimed,

on 26 November 1939, that the Finnish army had fired an artillery
salvo into the USSR.

On 28 November 1939, the Finnish leadership

decided to hold fast to their previous rejection, which brought
about further Soviet recriminations, some of which mentioned the
possibility of voiding the 1932 Non-Aggression Pact.

The next

step brought a Soviet offensive, and on 30 November 1939 the
Winter War was on.63
60 Jakobson, p. 7.
61 Mazour, p. 96.
62 Mazour, p. 98.
63 Mazour, pp. 109-110.
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The Soviet rationale for the attack on Finland was the need
to defend itself from the Germans.

The Soviet demand for a de

fensive alliance, already accepted by the Baltic states, was
rejected by Finland.

Stalin countered with a scaled down offer

that assured Leningrad's safety by the annexation of parts of
eastern Finland.

It also gave the Soviets military bases in

Hanko, on the Gulf of Finland, and in the Artie.64

Finnish envoy

Juho Paasikivi, a member of the moderate Agrarian party, turned
down the Soviet offer because it violated Finnish territorial
integrity, and correspondingly neutrality.

The Finnish Prime

Minister, Risto Ryti, a Social Democrat, then directed the now
Marshall Mannerheim to prepare Finland's defenses.
The Winter War lasted 100 days and ended in a cold and hard
fought stalemate.

Though the Finnish forces managed a draw, Ryti

approached the Soviets for a cessation of hostilities.

The Finns

had not been supported by the rest of Scandinavia or the Allies,
and as a result remained desperately short of war material and
foodstuffs.

Again, Paasikivi was called upon to do the

negotiating, and on 7 March 1940 Ryti signed the peace treaty
which leased the Hanko peninsula, and ceded part of eastern
Finland around Leningrad, to the Soviet Union.65
The Winter War ended Finland's hopes of remaining out of
World War II.

Short of supplies and stinging from the con

cessions made to the Soviets in March, the Finnish government,
64 Jakobson, pp. 10-11.
65 Jakobson, p. 14.
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now controlled almost wholly by the Social Democrats, responded
positively to German overtures promising aid.

On 12 September

1940, the Finnish leadership, headed by President Ryti and Social
Democratic party chief Vaino Tanner, initialed a troop transport
agreement with the Nazis.66
When the German offensive against the USSR began in earnest,
the resupplied Finnish army, under the direction of Mannerheim,
broke through the Soviet lines and regained all that they had
lost.

Mannerheim pressed further and managed to occupy most of

Soviet Karelia, on Finland's eastern border.
Ryti were not in league with the Nazis.

But Mannerheim and

The Finns were too

suspicious of the German leadership to integrate Finnish forces
into the Wehrmacht, and Ryti refused offers to join the Axis
powers.

The Finns described their collaboration with Germany as

"co-belligerency," implying that the connection between the two
was tenuous.

The distinction made between co-belligerency and

allying with the Nazis was not appreciated by the Kremlin, and
Stalin was furious with the Finnish leadership.67
Nonetheless, Mannerheim refused to participate in the German
siege of Leningrad or its attack on Murmansk.68

This benevolent

gesture toward Allied convoy movements, and the Finnish conten
tion that their war was one only of Finnish liberation, was un
dermined by their signature on the Nazi sponsored Anti-Comintern
66 Mazour, p. 136.
67 Pajanen, p. 157.
68 Jakobson, p. 18.
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Pact of 25 November 1941.69
As World War II progressed and the German army began to
disintegrate on the eastern front, the Finns still held onto a
large chunk of territory which had not been considered Finnish
before the war.

However, realizing the futility of remaining at

war with the Red Army for very much longer, President Mannerheim,
the new Conservative Party leader of the republic, who had
succeeded Ryti to the presidency in 1944, initiated peace talks
with the Soviets through his new head of government, Prime
Minister Paasikivi.70
The Peace Treaty of 1944 between the USSR and Finland was
facilitated to a large measure by Paasikivi1s integrity.
Paasikivi, the Finnish envoy in Moscow between hostilities, suc
ceeded in establishing a personal working relationship with
Stalin.

When Paasikivi resigned in protest at his government's

co-belligerency with the Nazis, his character was most dramati
cally exhibited to the Soviet leadership.71
Paasikivi accepted Stalin's insistence that the Soviets had
to protect Leningrad through a benevolent Finland.

He took

tangible action to dispel Soviet doubts about Finnish intentions
and, using Finnish troops, drove the remaining 200,000 German
troops from Finland into Norway.72
69 Mazour, p. 149.
70 Jakobson, p. 33.
71 Jakobson, p. 34.
72 Jakobson, pp. 54-55.
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The 1944 Peace Treaty was not the end point of the FinnoSoviet conflict and another round of talks was started after the
war.

The 1946 Paris Peace Treaty between the USSR and Finland

was negotiated without the input of the Allies, excepting a small
show of leniency by the British, for none but the Soviets and the
British had ever declared war on Finland, and only the Soviets
had fired a shot.73

As a result, the Soviets negotiated a peace

highly favorable to themselves which left Porkalla as a Soviet
military base on Finnish soil in Soviet hands.

In addition to

the reduction in territory suffered by Finland, the Soviets
exacted $300 million in reparations.74
The end of the Second World War marked the first, and
largely unsuccessful, attempt by Finland at neutrality.

For a

number of geo-political reasons, it is simple to understand why
Finland's attempt to stay out of great power conflict, without
sacrificing territorial integrity, was futile.

Simply, its

corner of Europe was claimed by both Germany and the Soviet
Union, countries which had exhibited expansionist aims and a
willingness to use their armies to achieve those aims.
tribution of power therefore adversely affected Finland.

The dis
It was

a corridor for German aggression in 1918 and again in 1941.

The

Soviets, renowned students of German military history, attempted
to forestall the second German push through Finland during the

73 Jakobson, pp. 20-22.
74 Jakobson, p. 26.
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2 0th century by initiating the Winter War, but surprisingly
failed.
Finnish co-belligerency with the Germans was not dictated by
the distribution of power but by Finnish concerns for the main
tenance of their sovereignty.

While the Finns did refuse Soviet

expansion on their corner of the Baltic, they also refused
German offers to integrate their army into the Wehrmacht.

The

German army and German supplies were a means to regain lost
territory, but under no circumstances was Mannerheim willing to
pay for this by accepting German domination.

Finish belligerency

in World War II was not expansionist but rather an attempt to
regain ground lost as a result of the Winter War, and to liberate
parts of the outlying Finnish speaking areas.

Taken as a whole,

Finland fought in WWII to re-establish state integrity.
Unlike the Irish, whose domestic political framework was
solid in its support of neutrality, the Finns lacked coherent
domestic support.

The Finnish Social Democrats, under the

direction of Ryti and Tanner, became scapegoats after the war for
initiating co-belligerency with the Germans and thereby increas
ing Soviet suspicions that Finland could not be counted on as a
benevolent neighbor.

The Conservatives, or National Coalition,

led by Mannerheim were a right of center party also willing to
forego neutrality if it meant waging a war to liberate Finnish
speaking people from Soviet domination.

After the resolution of

the conflict in 1946, the Soviets were suspicious of Tannerite
Social Democrats and the Conservatives, due to their support
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of the war against the USSR.
However, the Agrarian, or Central Party, came out of World
War II with their integrity intact in Soviet eyes, and this was
to be critically important in the re-establishment of credible
Finnish claims to neutrality.

The personality of Paasikivi, and

the refusal of the rest of the Agrarian leadership to participate
in the co-belligerency government rewarded them with a great deal
of foreign policy influence.

They were the only nationalist

party in Finland with whom the Soviets wished to deal.
Both the Irish and the Finns wished to stay out of World War
II and only the Irish were successful.

One is inclined to

ascribe this solely to Finland having been a buffer state between
the Soviet Union and Germany.

However, the Finns also lacked a

coherent domestic political leadership committed to neutrality.
By the end of the war, the Finns had found this political leader
ship in the Agrarian party, through its leader, President
Paasikivi.

While the acceptance of Irish neutrality by the

British was a factor in establishing the credibility of Irish
neutrality in international eyes, Paasikivi1s integrity and
Finnish fighting valour served the same purpose by gaining Soviet
recognition of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality after the war.

Chapter 2

"Solidification of Neutrality in Post-War Europe as Finland
and Ireland Cope with the East-West Division"
Formally, hostilities between Finland and the USSR were
brought to a close by the Paris Peace Treaty, negotiated in 1946
and signed in 1947.75

As is the case in most treaties ending

open warfare, the winner was able to extract some harsh con
cessions from the vanquished.

But although the Finns were

saddled with a Soviet military presence in Porkalla, a loss of
12% in territory, and $3 00 million in reparations, the Treaty
also contained a provision which prohibited the Finns from
joining alliances.76

This attempt to neutralize Finland gave

President Paasikivi a badly needed bulkhead to staunch the on
rushing East-West conflict over the reformation of Eastern and
Central Europe.
Paasikivi took positive steps to realize Finland's
aspiration for neutrality by mollifying the Soviets at every
turn, for it was they who presented Finland with its greatest
threat.

Paasikivi directed Finnish courts to sentence Social

Democratic collaborators, such as Tanner and Ryti, to confine
ment in Finnish prisons, which convinced the Soviet leadership
that the Finns were serious about rapprochement with their great

75 Mazour, p. 260.
76 Raimo Vayrynen, "The
Neutrality and Non-Alignment
Hans Neuhold (Wien: Wilhelm
Handlung Gesellschaft, 1982)

Neutrality of Finland," in
in Europe, eds. Karl Birnbaum and
Braumuller, Universitats Verlagsbuch
p. 133.
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neighbor.77

In addition, the cleansing of Tannerite influence,

or "war criminals," from the Social Democratic party removed the
possibility of Nazi collaborators participating in the immediate
post-war Finnish government.
The Finns also took care not to provoke Soviet anxiety by
not moving to integrate themselves with the reconstruction of
much of Western Europe.

In 1947 Paasikivi was invited to take

part in the Marshall Aid program, initiated by George Marshall to
ensure the economic remobilization of Europe.

Much to Soviet

delight, and at the cost of economic hardship to the Finnish
population, Paasikivi rejected Marshall Aid in order to stay out
of great power conflict.78
Paasikivi also refused to let the Soviet base in Porkalla,
the reduction in territory, and the reparation payments become a
point of contention in Finland's relations with the Soviets.
There existed little internal dissatisfaction with Soviet be
havior in Porkalla, and the reparation cheques arrived in Moscow
on schedule.79

By accepting the terms of the Treaty, while

refusing Marshall Aid and punishing the Finnish Nazi colla
borators, Paasikivi was able, in a remarkably short time, to
evoke trust among the Kremlin leadership.
Paasikivi was able to make these tangible gestures towards
the Soviet Union immediately after the war by maintaining a
77 Vayrynen, p. 133.
78 Mazour, p. 175.
79 Vayrynen, p. 134.
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consensus in his government on achieving good relations with the
Soviets.

The governments from 1945-8 were coalitions formed

between the Agrarian, or Central Party, the SKDL, or Communist
Party, and those Social Democrats not tainted by German colla
boration.80

Both the Agrarians and the Communists were committed

to Soviet accommodation.

The Social Democrats and the Agrarians

were committed to maintaining Finland's free market economic or
ganization and a liberal democratic political structure.

Thus,

the Soviet Union's security needs were accommodated without
changing Finland's political or economic organization; an anomaly
in Eastern and Central Europe that the USSR accepted.
Demonstrating, rhetorically, his concern for Soviet security
interests, Paasikivi stated in 1947, "If anyone tries to attack
the Soviet Union through our territory we shall together with the
Soviet Union fight against the aggressor as hard and for as long
as we can."81

The Soviets wanted an assurance in writing, how

ever, as they had already obtained from Hungary and Romania.

On

23 February 1948, therefore the day of the Communist takeover in
Prague, Paasikivi was informed by the Soviet envoy that he should
come to Moscow to negotiate a mutual defense treaty.82
With this request, the Soviets tested the resolve of the
Finns to maintain their sovereignty within a liberal democratic
system while nations to the south of Finland were capitulating to
80 Vloyantes, p. 70.
81 Jakobson, p. 38.
82 Jakobson, pp. 36-37.
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Soviet demands.

Paasikivi asked for enough time to meet with

the Finnish parliamentary leadership, and he attempted to include
the widest possible spectrum of political beliefs on his nego
tiating team.

He was, of course, under pressure to negotiate a

treaty with the Soviets that would prove satisfactory to the USSR
while retaining Finnish prerogatives in foreign policy.

He also

had to sell the treaty to the Finnish parliament, which was not
entirely predisposed to meet Soviet demands, which called for the
security of Leningrad and the Northwestern USSR.83
The result of the negotiating process was the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which was
ratified by the Finnish parliament on 28 April 1948.
last for ten years.84

It was to

The Treaty, as outlined in the intro

duction of this paper, provided the Soviet Union with security
from aggression through Finnish territory.

It provided for con

sultations if a threat of aggression was perceived, and acknow
ledged the Finnish claim to neutrality.

It made no reference to

the reorganization, on Soviet lines, of the political or economic
structures of Finland.

The FCMA set down on paper what Paasikivi

was already committed to in relations with the Soviets.

It came

to be known as the Paasikivi, or Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.85
Kekkonen was to succeed Paasikivi as President.
The Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was tested that very year, 1948.
83 Jakobson, p. 40.
84 Faloon, p. 4.
85 Faloon, p. 5.
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Distaste for the Finnish Communist Party was growing in the
electorate, formented by Social Democratic accusations that the
Minister of Interior, the Communist Yrjo Leino, had deported
Finnish Social Democrats to the Soviet Union in 1948 to serve the
remainder of their prison terms for Nazi collaboration.86

In

addition to this charge, it was widely rumored that the Com
munists, who favored extremely close links with the Soviets, were
planning a coup d'etat to effect this end.

While none of the

accusations could be substantiated, they were sufficient to cast
doubts on the patriotic resolve of the Communist Party and
brought the Social Democrats, under the leadership of Karl
Fagerholm, to victory in the parliamentary elections.87
The 1948 Fagerholm government proved to be shortlived, main
ly because of Agrarian distrust and Soviet displeasure.

How

ever, the 1948 political gambit by the Social Democrats did
accomplish two things of relatively long-lasting duration.

They

and the Communists remained enemies until the mid 1960's, and the
Soviets were convinced of the complete unreliability of Social
Democratic led governments in Finland.88
The 1950's brought into focus the impending retirement of
Paasikivi, who announced he would not seek reelection in 1956.
As the Social Democratic collaborators, Ryti and Tanner, were
released, having done their penance, it was speculated that
86 Vloyantes, p. 73.
87 Vloyantes, p. 74.
88 Vloyantes, p. 77.
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Tanner, in particular, might head the Social Democratic campaign
for the presidency.

The Soviet Union watched these events

unfold, and some particularly livid articles in Izvestia warned
Tanner and Ryti to stay out of the race.89

It was becoming clear

that a corollary of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was that, in
order to satisfy Soviet security needs, the Soviets had to be
able to trust the Finnish leadership.

Therefore, Tanner and Ryti

had to be excluded from Finnish politics if relations with the
Soviets were to remain cordial, a price the Social Democrats were
not yet ready to pay.
As the 1955 presidential election drew near, Paasikivi and
the Agrarian presidential candidate, Prime Minister Urho
Kekkonen, were invited to Moscow two years ahead of schedule to
renegotiate the FCMA.90

Soviet Premier Nickolai Bulganin

informed the Finns that, although the base in Porkalla was leased
to the Soviet Union for fifty years under the terms of the Paris
Peace Treaty, and contributed to the defense of Leningrad by
securing the Gulf of Finland, the Soviets would return it to
Finnish control by 1956.91
The Soviets were evincing their trust in Finnish intentions.
They were aware that the Finns knew that Leningrad's defense and
Finland's integrity were inexorably intertwined.

But the Soviets

might also have had an ulterior motive for pulling out of
89 Vloyantes, p. 83.
90 Jakobson, p. 45.
91 Vloyantes, p. 60.
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Porkalla

early.

The 1956 Finnish presidential election was

apparently going to be decided at the eleventh hour, and the
Soviets were willing to convert the return of Porkalla into
political capital for the Agrarian candidate, Kekkonen.
Partly because of his participation in the negotiations
which removed the last territorial barrier to Finnish neutrality,
Kekkonen was inaugurated President in 1956.

His victory was an

important event in retaining good relations with the USSR.

The

election had been extremely close and was decided by only one
vote out of three hundred in the Finnish electoral college.
Kekkonen's opponent, Social Democrat Karl Fagerholm, was clearly
distrusted by the Soviets, but by espousing the foreign policy
line of his predecessor and emphasizing his own role in the
return of Porkalla, Kekkonen won both the trust of the Kremlin
and the election.92

However, the

opposition of the largest

party, the Social Democrats, evident in the closeness of the
electoral college results, suggested that a working consensus for
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was precarious.

This raised the

possibility of future confrontations with the USSR which could
bring Finnish sovereignty into question.
The credibility of Finnish neutrality had to be established
in the West as well as in the East.

It was thought by some in

the West that Finland was little more than a Soviet puppet.

Al

though the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line gave a preponderant role to
gestures designed to curry Soviet favor, the Finns did stop short
92 Vloyantes, p. 80.
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of being drawn behind the Iron Curtain.

In 1955, they refused to

join the Warsaw Pact, discouraging Soviet consolidation
attempts.93

They felt able to say no to the Soviet invitation

because they had attempted to demilitarize Scandinavia.

In 1952,

Prime Minister Kekkonen advanced the idea of a pan-Scandinavian
neutrality.

It failed because NATO members Iceland, Norway, and

Denmark refused to participate.94

However, in a gesture to the

Finns, German forces were kept out of NATO exercises in
Scandinavia to avoid fueling the Soviet paranoia.95
1955 was the year Finland joined the United Nations where it
proceeded to pursue an activist course in promoting the United
Nations' mediatory role in hostilities.96

The Finns were also

careful not to let their activism in the United Nations bring
them into conflict with Soviet imperialism.

For instance, al

though the Finns participated in the 1956 Sinai Peacekeeping
Force, and condemned Britain, France, and Israel, for their role
in the 1956 Middle East War, they did not protest the Soviet
Union's violent repression of Hungarian nationalists, which coin
cided with the Suez crisis.97
By 1957 the Soviets, having vacated Porkalla a year earlier,
proclaimed a new interpretation of the FCMA.
93 Jakobson, p. 58.
94 Vloyantes, p. 167.
95 Vloyantes, p. 152.
96 Vloyantes, p. 87.
97 Jakobson, p. 102.
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the agreement foremost as a guarantee of Finnish neutrality, and
only secondarily as a representation of Soviet Security
interests.98

Unfortunately, 1957 also marked the comeback of

Vaino Tanner as he resumed his post as chairman of the Social
Democratic Party.

Again, relations between the two nations

cooled because Tanner's political reemergence was coupled with a
Social Democratic victory in the parliamentary elections, which
once again gave the premiership to Karl Fagerholm.99
The Fagerholm government provoked a crisis in Finland known
as the "Nightfrost."10°

Soviet displeasure with the reascendent

Social Democrats was not lost on President Kekkonen, who under
stood that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line depended in large part on
who occupied the major cabinet posts.
In order to maintain his credibility with the Soviet Union,
which rested largely on his own relationship with Moscow's
leadership, Kekkonen could not allow the Agrarians to remain in a
coalition headed by Tannerite Social Democrats which included the
Conservatives.101

This provoked a loss of confidence in the

Finnish parliament and the fall of the Fagerholm government,
which brought in a Center-Left coalition.

The new government

included the Social Democrats, minus Fagerholm and the
Tannerites, and gave the premiership back to the Agrarians.
98 Jakobson, p. 49.
99 Vloyantes, p. 141.
100 Vloyantes, p. 141.
101 Vloyantes, p. 95.
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This arrangement was not threatened until 1961.
1961 signalled the start of another campaign for the presi
dency.

Olavi Honka, a former jurist, was supported by the Social

Democrats and the Conservatives in a run against Kekkonen.102
However, his campaign was unsuccessful because a complex series
of events, perhaps orchestrated by the Soviets, gave Kekkonen an
outstanding foreign policy victory, and enough political clout to
win reelection.
The Berlin Wall crisis

of August 1961, and the end of dis

armament talks between the Americans and the Soviets, had renewed
East-West tensions.

With Superpower relations clearly on the

wane, Kekkonen was again requested to journey eastward for con
sultations on the FCMA.

The invitation was delivered on 3 0

October 1961, the day the Soviet Union exploded a fifty megaton
weapon, an ominous coincidence.103
Kekkonen was not in Helsinki to receive Kruschev's request.
Instead, he was in Hawaii, relaxing after a summit with President
Kennedy at which he had received assurances from the president
that Finland's special neutrality was understood in
Washington.104

Kekkonen did not immediately respond to the

Soviet threat.

He sent his foreign minister to the Kremlin in

order

to buy himself some time and prevent any rash actions by

the USSR.
102 Vloyantes, p. 112.
103 Jakobson, p. 70.
104 Jakobson, p. 72.
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Facing a tight race for reelection, Kekkonen could not
simultaneously enter negotiations with the Soviet Union and hope
to allay Soviet fear about Finnish credibility.

To the Soviet

Union, credibility in Finland rested upon Kekkonen's shoulders.
Unless Kekkonen could convince the Soviets that he would remain
president, his negotiating position would weaken correspondingly.
He therefore dissolved parliament and called for early elections.
This move forced the Conservatives and the Social Democrats to
break with solidarity in order to win seats in the parliament.
It also meant that the Social Democratic and Conservative
alliance in support of Olavi Honka, known as the Honka Front, was
thrown into disarray, for the Social Democrats and Conservatives
could hardly contest each other over parliamentary seats and hope
to reconcile their differences for a common presidential
candidate.

As a result, the Honka Front split apart and Honka

withdrew from the campaign, assuring Kekkonen's reelection.105
Only then, on 18 November 1961, did Kekkonen present himself
to Kruschev in Novosibirsk, Siberia, where he convinced the
General Secretary that the USSR had nothing to gain by invoking
the defense clause of the FCMA.
in East-West relations was past.

Kekkonen argued that the crisis
By militarizing Finland with

the Red Army, Kekkonen argued, Kruschev would provoke counter
measures by the NATO countries in Scandinavia and considerable
anti-Soviet propaganda would result.

Instead, Kekkonen sug

gested, with his reelection assured and Finno-Soviet relations
105 Jakobson, p. 78.
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put on firm ground for six more years, the General Secretary
should rescind his proposal, and reaffirm his trust in the
Kekkonen leadership and Finland's desire to remain out of great
power competition.106
Kekkonen's trip to Siberia established an important pre
cedent in the interpretation of the FCMA.

For it to be invoked,

both parties had to recognize aggression.

In this case, the

Finns clearly had not.

The Finns established the right to say no

if perceived aggression was simply a Soviet fabrication because
in 1961 NATO was not about to roll through Finland en route to
Leningrad.

Kekkonen's victory at Novosibirsk also sealed his

reelection for it established, without a doubt, his personal
importance to Finland's international credibility.

As Kruschev

bluntly put it, "Whoever is for Kekkonen is for friendship with
the Soviet Union and whoever is against Kekkonen is against
friendship with the Soviet Union."107
In 1952 Kekkonen advocated a nuclear free and neutral
Scandinavia while concurrently applying for membership in the
Nordic Council, which he achieved in 1955.108

Again, in 1963,

Kekkonen called for Scandinavia to become nuclear free and for
its NATO members to opt for neutrality.

Its aim was to reduce

the strategic importance of the North, and this was partly
accomplished in 1964 with the removal of nuclear weapons from
106 Jakobson, p. 78.
107 Jakobson, p. 77.
108 Faloon, p. 5.
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Scandinavian soil by the NATO countries.109

In 1965 he attempted

to demilitarize Lapland, where the Warsaw Pact forces stand toe
to toe with NATO on the Norwegian-Soviet border.110

In the

United Nations the Finns advocated an active mediatory role but
stayed clear of criticism of the USSR whenever possible.

They

participated heavily in peacekeeping ventures in order to
establish their role as mediators and promoters of stability.

In

all, over 15,000 Finnish troops have served in such widely
divergent locals as the Congo, Cyprus, Laos, the Golan Heights,
and the Sinai.111
Complimenting Finland's high profile abroad as an active
mediator, acceptable to both East and West, was a gradual change
in the leadership profile of the Social Democrats.

Fagerholm,

Tanner, and Ryti had retired, and by 1965 the Soviets announced
to Kekkonen that a Social Democrat led government was no long
er threatening to them.112

The 1966 Social Democratic victory

was even applauded by Premier Kosygin, and he communicated to the
Social Democrats that the government of Social Democrat Paasio
had his complete trust.

This, of course, was due to the support

given the Social Democrats by the Agrarians and the Communists,
as well as the absence of Tannerites in the rejuvenated Social

109 Faloon, p. 6.
110 Faloon, p. 6.
111 Pajanen, p. 163.
112 Vloyantes, p. 129.
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Democrat ic leadership.113
By the late 1960's detente was starting to accelerate, and
the Finns played an active part, hosting the opening round of
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969.114

In 1972 the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in
Helsinki, with the Finns taking part as one of the neutral and
nonaligned (NNA) countries, further solidifying recognition of
the Finnish neutral role.

The Helsinki Final Act, signed at the

conclusion of the CSCE, was a highwater mark in detente, with
the host Finns actively involved throughout.115
Coinciding with the emergence of Finnish neutrality was
Finland's attempt to integrate itself into the Western European
economic prosperity without sacrificing its trade relationship
with the USSR.

On 27 March 1961, President Kekkonen negotiated

an agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that
offered Finland the opportunity to enjoy the economic benefits of
the free trade area without actually joining the organization.
In addition, the Finns could continue their Most Favoured Nation
treaty with the Soviets without endangering their new found EFTA
affiliation.116
In December 1967 the Finns joined the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the successor of the
113 Vloyantes, p. 13 6.
114 Vloyantes, p. 152.
115 Faloon, p. 8.
116 Jakobson, p. 61.
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Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and was a
signatory of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
as Well.117

To balance Finland's growing involvement with

Western economic organizations, Kekkonen reassured the Soviets by
signing a twenty year extension of the FCMA in 1970, and in 1971
initiating

a bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet sponsored

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.118

After Kekkonen

strengthened his formal economic ties with the East, he was ready
to attempt a separate agreement with the European Economic
Community.

This move was especially important to Finland because

of Britain's recent entry.

Within the EFTA, Great Britain had

been one of Finland's largest trading partners, due to British
use of Finnish timber products.

Finland's negotiations with the

Community took place at the end of another presidential term, and
the combination of Kekkonen possibly leaving the presidency and
further Finnish integration with the West worried the Soviets.
Once again, the unique relationship between Kekkonen and the
Kremlin proved to be the deciding factor.

Kekkonen was reelected

with almost complete unanimity and Finland was able to conclude
an external association agreement with the Community in 1974.119
Though Finland was not a member of the Community, its products
would not be barred from the Community's free trade area, and its
relationship with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
117 Jakobson, p. 61.
118 Faloon, p. 8.
119 Faloon, p. 8.
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would not jeopardize its Western European contacts.
By the end of this time period, it had become highly advan
tageous, politically, for Finland to support a policy of neu
trality which accommodated the security interests of the Soviet
Union through the consistent application of the PaasikiviKekkonen line.

Finland's mainstream politicians all advocated

neutrality, but as Fagerholm found out twice, it was possible to
subscribe to an interpretation of neutrality which failed to give
sufficient notice of the interest of the Soviet Union in the
Finnish election results.

If a man won an election in Finland,

who had previously supported a cause detrimental to the Soviet
Union, like Nazi collaboration, his chances of staying in office
were nil.

And it was only after the Social Democratic Party

jettisoned the remnants of Tannerite influence that it had the
chance to form a stable government.
The premium placed on holding onto governmental power
eventually convinced three of the four major political parties,
the Agrarians, Communists, and Social Democrats, that a benevo
lent neutrality, supported by the force of Kekkonen's person
ality, could both satisfy the Soviet Union and put them into
office.

Only the Conservatives failed to come to this realiza

tion, and as a result, were largely ostracized in the process of
coalition negotiations.
The domestic political framework of Finland, as in most of
Scandinavia, favored a preponderant role for the Social

-45-

Democrats.

Although the Social Democrats, were for much of the

the post-War era, the largest political party, they were kept
from fully exercising their numerical advantage because they did
not reconcile the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line with the Tannerite
leadership.

As a result, neutrality did not always provide

stability for Finland, which went through the crises of two
aborted Fagerholm governments, in 1948 and 1958, and the Honka
Front-FCMA note crisis of 1961.
The need to maintain the integrity of Finland from assimi
lation by the Soviet Union was another factor in the development
of Finnish neutrality.

One of the hallmarks of the Paasikivi-

Kekkonen line was the importance of personal relationships
between the Soviet and Finnish leadership.

Thus, in 1961 Finnish

sovereignty was certainly enhanced, if not saved, by Kruschev's
trust in Kekkonen.

Neutrality, as exercised by Paasikivi and

Kekkonen, was not a drab policy, and they understood that the
Soviets wanted more than bureaucratic inertia committed to a
course of perpetual neutrality.
trality personalized

The Soviets wanted to see neu

and, as long as Paasikivi and Kekkonen held

the presidency, the Soviets had their wish.

The credibility of

Finnish neutrality was used to preserve Finnish sovereignty, but
the credibility of Finnish neutrality was preserved by Kekkonen
and Paasikivi.
Finally, and quite obviously, the distribution of power in
post-War Europe placed Finland within the USSR's sphere of
influence.

So if the Finns wished to maintain their chosen
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political and economic structures, both inimicable to Soviet
communism, they had to allay Soviet security concerns.

Neu

trality became a tool with which to demilitarize their part of
the North, and Finland convinced its fellow Scandinavians to
tread with care.

German soldiers were therefore kept out of

maneuvers in Scandinavia, and both Denmark and Norway became
nuclear free NATO states.

Finnish neutrality was aimed at

removing Finland as a strategic point of contention.

If this

could be accomplished, the USSR would have no need to exert its
power, or to absorb Finland as it had Poland, Romania, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia.

However, though distribution of power con

strained the Finns to accommodate Soviet security interests, the
maintenance of Finnish integration with the West, in the Nordic
Council, with the Community, with the EFTA, and in the United
Nations, allowed the Finns a chance to present their neutrality
to the realities of the distribution of power.

It was

illustrated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, a culmination of
negotiations synonymous with the promotion of dialogue between
the great power blocs.
*

*

*

*

*

Having demonstrated its sovereignty in the successful
neutrality by de Valera and Fianna Fail, Ireland changed govern
ments in 1948 and Taoiseach John A. Costello, with a Fine Gael
coalition which included Labour and Clann na Poblachta members,
assumed control.

It was under Costello that the remaining ties

to Great Britain were undone, and Ireland became a republic in
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1949, after having repealed the External Relations Act in 1948,
formally disassociating Ireland from the Commonwealth.120
Though Ireland was now unfettered by any formal links to the
Commonwealth, it did not shy away from the foreign policy prece
dent set by de Valera.

Neutrality had acquired enormous popular

ity as a symbol under which the Irish in the south had united and
proved their sovereignty.121
In 1949 Ireland was invited to join NATO and refused in
order to reassert its predilection for military neutrality.
Neither Costello nor his coalition partners felt they had the
political capital necessary for the abdication of neutrality.
The Minister for External Affairs, Sean MacBride, personally
supported joining the Atlantic Alliance but felt he could not
bring his party along with him.122

MacBride was a member of

Clann na Poblachta, a party committed to the republican cause of
reunification.

It also had a domestic political agenda which

would be harmed if money was diverted to the defense spending
made necessary by the obligations of a defensive alliance.123
Therefore, MacBride publicly said, "Any military alliance with or
commitment involving a military alliance with the state that is
responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland would be

120 Fisk, p. 469.
121 Raymond, p. 39.
122 Raymond, p. 49.
123 Raymond, p. 38-39.
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entirely repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people."124
Privately, the Irish leadership appeared ready to initiate
some form of defense cooperation with the West, though this would
mean a corresponding loss of autonomy in the conduct of Irish
foreign policy.

Noting that NATO membership was politically

untouchable, MacBride suggested to President Truman that the US
and Ireland should consummate a bilateral defense agreement.

But

the Americans had lost interest in Irish defense cooperation and
MacBride's proposal was ignored.125
In 1955, Liam Cosgrave, the Minister for External Affairs in
another Fine Gael coalition, suggested that the Irish were com
mitted to fighting the spread of communism, though not formally a
part of NATO.126

This suggestion, along with MacBride's private

attitude toward NATO and de Valera's assertion of a special con
sideration to be shown for Britain's security, seemed to validate
a US National Security Council report issued in 1955.
claimed that Ireland

could be expected to show the

able sympathy in an East-West

This

West consider

conflict, notwithstanding the Irish

claim to neutrality.127
1955 also marked Irish entry into the United Nations.

The

Soviet Union dropped its objection to Irish membership, as a
Western vote, when a package deal between the Soviets and the
124 Keatinge, A

Singular Stance, p. 21.

125 Keatinge, A

Singular Stance, p. 22.

126 Fisk, p. 477.
127 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations. p. 94.
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West was worked out.

Most importantly for the Irish was their

chance to demonstrate to an international audience what was meant
by their neutrality.

The Irish policy of voting on General

Assembly resolutions on their merits, divorcing considerations of
East vs. West from the decision process, was initiated by
Cosgrave and developed more thoroughly by his successor, Frank
Aiken.128
Frank Aiken succeeded Cosgrave as Minister for External
Affairs in 1957, when Fianna Fail once again was able to form the
government.

Aiken advocated a middle power role for Ireland.

For example, the Irish supported the right of self-determination
in developing countries, a goal the Irish themselves had not long
since attained.

The Irish also believed in regional rather than

East-West solutions to conflicts in developing areas like the
Congo, the Middle East and Indochina.

By fulfilling a mediatory

role as peacekeeper within United Nations contingents, and using
the United Nations as a forum to promote general disarmament, the
Irish were able to promote stability while establishing their
neutral credentials to a larger audience.
The Irish support for the Peoples Republic of China as the
legitimate representative of China in the United Nations was
balanced by the fact that the Irish voted with the US 75% of the

128 Garret FitzGerald, "Ireland, Europe, and America,"
Atlantic Community Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1981-2) p.
485.
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time.129

The Irish were committed to judging issues on their

merits, for example Chinese representation and disarmament, and
this separated them from their Western neighbor's views which
were more polarized in an East vs West fashion due to the Cold
War.

The Irish castigated the Soviet repression of Hungary in

1956 and the concurrent Suez Canal intervention by Britain,
France and Israel.

By taking the moral high ground, deploring

the use of violence, and promoting a vision of international
justice based on self-determination and stability, the Irish
carved out a niche in the United Nations which promoted their own
interest, as a small neutral state, in staying out of conflict.
An example of this was Aiken's sponsorship of a nuclear non
proliferation treaty in the United Nations during 1958.130
The next watershed in the formulation and practice of Irish
neutrality was the 1961 decision by Taoiseach Sean Lemass to seek
European Economic Community membership.131

Lemass was convinced

that, economically, Ireland had to remain integrated with the
West.

At one time, he had been prepared to compromise Irish

neutrality for that end, as he argued in a 1959 Oxford Union

129 Ronald J. Hill & Michael O'Corcora, ''The Soviet Union in
Irish Foreign Policy," International Affairs. Vol. 58, No. 2
(Spring 1982) p. 467.
130 Patrick Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC,"
in National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation.
ed. Christopher Hill (Winchester, M a . ; Allen and Unwin, 1983) p.
144.
131 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 24.
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debate.132

Lemass said affiliation with NATO would be an

acceptable prerequisite to Community membership if it could be
secured in no other way.133
At this point, in the early 1960's, Lemass seemed to regard
Ireland's economic future as more important than Irish neutrali
ty, unlike Aiken and de Valera, men from his own party.

Further

more, Lemass also appeared to be moving away from the United
Nations as Ireland's primary forum.
Lemass oriented Irish neutrality toward possible Community
membership and put more emphasis on European cooperation.
Neither de Valera's hope for a neutralized Ireland nor Aiken's
quest for a more fundamental and complete neutrality based on the
Swedish model, would be reconciled with Lemass' pragmatic outlook
for the economic health of the state.134
Throughout the 1960's, the Irish government continued to
press for Community membership, while using as bait the
of some movement away from neutrality.

prospect

But for all their

rhetoric, the behavior of the Irish in the United Nations changed
very little.

Their voting record still suggested concern for

self-determination and they continued to contribute heavily to
United Nations peacekeeping ventures.
132 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 25.
133 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 94.
134 Trevor C. Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Com
munity?" Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 20, No. 3,
(March 1982), p. 206.
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In 1972 a referendum in Ireland on Community membership was
won, but although the new Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, and his
Foreign Minister, Patrick Hillery, had hinted at the possibility
of trading a change in defense policy for admission to the Com
munity, this did not happen and neutrality escaped unscathed.135
The Hague Summit of 1973 paved the way for Irish admission into
the Community.

In that year the new Foreign Minister, Garret

FitzGerald, stressed the continued likelihood of an independent
Irish foreign policy, its affiliation with the Community not
withstanding.

Due to Ireland's historical experience and the

Irish predilection for avoiding great power conflicts, its
foreign policy would not be altered by Community membership, and
Irish neutrality would continue.136
FitzGerald expressed a personal distaste for the politics of
NATO and publicly emphasized the advantageous role Ireland could
play by differentiating Community policy from that of NATO.

In

his view, Ireland could lend the Community a civilian image.137
He noted that neither the Treaty of Rome nor Paris, the main Com
munity covenants, required a military commitment, and he fought
those who argued within the Community for further defense commit
ments.138

The Irish asserted that defense obligations concom-

mitant to Community membership were inappropriate.
135 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 27-28.
136 Salmon, p. 218.
137 FitzGerald, p. 485.
138 Salmon, p. 212.
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defense obligations were to be accepted in the future, it would
be as a consequence of political cooperation between member
states, not as a prerequisite to further integration.139
Ireland did much to alleviate Community concern over its
non-participation in NATO when it participated in the CSCE as a
Community member and not as one of the Neutral and Non-Aligned
states.

It joined the other eight Community members at the time

in their support of detente and stability within the CSCE
structure.140

One byproduct of the CSCE which served to further

Irish interests was the artificial distinction made between
security and defense.

By security was meant the maintenance of

economic survival, internal freedom, and the lowering of tensions
and management of conflicts.

By defense was meant dimensions of

military defense such as the coordination of strategic and
tactical

planning, arms manufacture and sale, and the command

and movement of troops.141

This distinction, though some have

argued security is a seamless whole which includes military
dimensions, gave the Irish enough room to participate in common
measures adopted by the Community which furthered the interests
of security but could not be classified as purely defense issues
which might degenerate into the East vs. West competition the
Irish had spent thirty years trying to avoid.

An example of

Irish cooperation on security rather than defense within the
139 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 87.
140 Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 142.
141 Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 140.
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community was their acceptance of Community funded ships to
patrol boundaries, ostensibly a non-defense initiative meant to
protect Ireland's fisheries.
In 1975 Garret FitzGerald assumed the Presidency of the
European Council of Ministers and was given a chance to put into
practice his earlier assertions concerning Ireland's natural
sympathy for developing peoples, a product of its historical
experience, and the dimension which Irish membership gave to the
Community in its projection of a civilian entity apart from
NATO.142
Ireland had not altered its United Nations voting pattern as
a result of Community membership, and combined with the Belgians,
Dutch and Danes, it presented a progressive voice in both the
United Nations and the Community.

They had refused to partici

pate in an earlier Community sponsored force in the Sinai on the
grounds the United Nations was the proper organization to act as
a mediator because it was not controlled by any one power bloc
consistently, and had established a solid peacekeeping record in
Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Ireland's neutrality

also enabled it to supply peacekeeping forces in both Cyprus and
the Sinai, conflicts which had provoked considerable disunity
among NATO members.143

In fact, the Irish supplied so many

peacekeeping troops to the Sinai that some had to be called home
after a rash of bombings in Monaghan and Dublin required their
142 Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 137.
143 Salmon, pp. 225-226.
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presence in Ireland.144
FitzGerald, during his term as the President of the European
Council of Ministers, from January to June of 1975, successfully
negotiated the Euro-African dialogue at Lome, the talks being
facilitated, according to some, by Ireland's neutrality, its
advocacy of development in the Third World, and its history as
part of the British empire.

It was also FitzGerald who was

called upon to negotiate with the post-revolutionary leaders of
Portugal in that same year, again because of Ireland's neutral
stance.145
Ireland also took tentative steps in the early 1970's to
improve its relationships with communist Europe, which had been
distant due, in large part, to the Irish Catholic antipathy to
communism in general.146

There were no diplomatic relations

with the Soviet Union until 1973.

Since 1946, when the Soviets

vetoed Ireland's admission to the United Nations, relations
between the Soviet Union and Ireland were rudimentary at best.
They did not interact culturally, politically, economically,
militarily, or otherwise to any great degree, if at all.

With

the gradual reorientation of Irish policy toward the European
theatre and Community membership, the Irish interest in contact
with the East also began to grow.
144 Trevor C. Salmon, "The Changing Nature of Irish Defense
Policy," World Today. Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1981-1982), p. 467.
145 Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Community?" p. 218.
146 Hill, p. 265.
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In the early seventies, Patrick Hillery, the Foreign
Minister, demonstrated an ability to separate such issues as
\

trade and commerce from Ireland's natural concern for freedom and
self-determination in Eastern Europe, and the general antics of
Soviet imperialism which had strained relations between the
countries.147

In 1973, Garret FitzGerald completed Hillery's

initiative and opened full diplomatic relations between the
Soviet Union and Ireland.

The carrot of potentially vast markets

for Irish goods gave him the strength to overcome domestic
opposition to establishing relations with the USSR.

He success

fully extended the policy of Lemass and Lynch, which gave
economic benefits an equal weight with moral considerations in
Irish foreign policy.148
Unlike the Finnish party spectrum, which had only belatedly
come to accept the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of neutrality, there
was a relative consensus among Irish politicians, that personal
feelings aside, military neutrality had to be maintained.

As

such, governments were not made or unmade on the issue of neu
trality.

The policy had enormous symbolic value as a unifying

force and a manifestation of Irish independence.
Only by the 1960s, with the advent of an economic, and
therefore European, orientation in Irish foreign policy, did
neutrality seem threatened by Community membership, which

147 Hill, p. 261.
148 Hill, p. 261.
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demanded some political solidarity on the part of member states.
But, as the Finns would not abandon their commitment to free
enterprise and an open form of government because of the FCMA,
neither would Ireland sacrifice its concern for distributive
justice and self-determination, which was a manifestation of
Ireland's sovereignty and was made practical by neutrality,
because of Community membership.
Irish peacekeeping contributions in the United Nations, like
the Finnish response, were attempts to assert their state
sovereignty and gain wider acceptance for their neutrality.
Also, the Irish were able to assert their independence through
their voting record, which was labeled "progressive" and not
clearly aligned to either of the major power blocs.

This con

trasted with the Finnish voting pattern in the United Nations in
which the Finns quite glaringly refrained from citicising the
USSR's forays into Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Finns could

assert their independence through United Nations mediatory
efforts, but would endanger their autonomy by criticising Soviet
repression.
The distribution of power mattered less in constraining
Irish foreign policy in the post-War period than it did during
the conflict.

Great Britain fell in political and military

stature and was no longer a Superpower as it had been.

Though

British military power was not likely to be exercised as a threat
to Ireland, the British economy was the lifeblood of the Irish
economy and, if they so chose, the British could exert
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considerable economic power upon the Irish.

Thus it was

essential for the Irish to follow the British into the Community,
lest they be economically crippled.
in Finland.

Just the opposite occurred

Their economy could have been integrated wholly into

the West, but a move in that direction would have brought a
Soviet response.

The Soviets, unlike the British, had shown a

willingness to use force in repressing neighboring countries
during the post-War era and the Finns did not want to be in that
number.

The decision by the Finnish government to seek

concurrent agreement with the communist states when they sought
Community affiliation was purely obeisance to Soviet power.
The distribution of power constrained the Irish economi
cally.

Unlike Sweden they could not practice both an economic

neutrality and a military neutrality.

The Finns simply had no

choice but to develop their economy to the point that economic
parity in their relations with East and West was observed.

While

the activism of the Irish was not constrained by concerns of
Western power, the Finns were constrained by the presence of
Soviet power and they tempered their neutral stance to this fact.

Chapter 3
"The Current Challenge"
In 1976 Leo Tindemans, the Belgian foreign minister, issued
a report which suggested that steps toward the formation of an
eventual European Union ought to include issues of defense.149
This was one of the first papers within a Community context which
seemed to threaten Irish neutrality, if only theoretically at the
moment, because European Union remains a pipedream.
response to Tindeman's proposal was negative.

The Irish

Ireland's stance

was that further European integration must precede defense
cooperation, and part of the integration process must be the
lessening of the disparity in wealth among Community members.
Even were rough economic parity to occur among Community members,
an Irish commitment on defense would still be judged on its
merits, with no guarantee of a positive response.150
Of course, Ireland would not seem strategically important to
Community defense.

NATO has bases to the north of Ireland in

Greenland and Norway, and to the south in the Portuguese Azores,
which would render Ireland redundant as a link to the US.151
Though the airports of Shannon and Dublin could prove useful, the
Continent has bigger and better facilities that would be more
proximate to a conflict, should one occur.
In 1981 the spectre of defense commitments within the
Community was again raised by the Genscher-Colombo report, the
149 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 29.
150 Keatinge, "Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 140.
151 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 63-64.
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product of the German and Italian foreign ministers.152
Genscher-Colombo was regarded with suspicion in Ireland because
it suggested that future European integration ought to include
defense cooperation.

This raised the question of a neutral's

place in a future Community modified by Genscher-Colombo.
A response to Genscher-Colombo was produced on 13 May 1981
during a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

The President of

the Council, British Foreign Secretary Carrington, in a personal
statement, stressed that neither the London Report nor the
Genscher-Colombo proposal were meant to embarrass the Irish.
Instead, the two reports were meant to emphasize a flexible and
pragmatic approach to common security issues confronting
Community members.153
Beyond the theoretical consequences the two proposals might
have to Ireland and the practice of its foreign policy, it was
evident that the Irish were not constrained in their positions on
contentious international issues by the need for a European con
sensus, nor were they being pressured to conform.

They criti

cised the Camp David Accord, for example, which was widely
applauded in the rest of the Community, because it failed to
resolve the Palestinian homeland question or include the rest of
the Arab world.154

They called for an end to apartheid before

the rest of the Community, and pressed for sanctions against
152 Keatinge, "Neutrality inside EPC," p. 149.
153 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 89-90.
154 Keatinge, "Neutrality inside EPC," p. 143.
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South Africa and Namibia.

This initiative was vetoed by both

Britain and France in the UN Security Council.155
European integration or no, the Irish still adhered to their
policy of judging each case on its merits, which might or might
not bring it into line with the more powerful members of the
Community.

For example, they condemned the Soviet Union for its

actions in Afghanistan in 1980, and condemned the criminal action
of hostage-taking in the US Embassy in Tehran.

In all these

cases, the overriding Irish concern was for self-determination
and justice.156

Irish neutrality certainly did not seem

threatened by Ireland's membership in the Community, judging from
its response to current issues.

And talk of further European

integration did not interfere with Irish neutrality, if one can
judge by the practice of Irish foreign policy.
Ireland's performance in international relations did not
raise doubts about its commitment to neutrality and it was clear
that, in the domestic political arena, neutrality was again a
prized mantle.

In 1980, Taoiseach Haughey raised the possibility

of changes in Irish defense policy as a quid pro quo for British
concessions on the border question, and in 1981, the Dail debated
the question of whether neutrality should or should not be the
basis of Irish foreign policy.157

The Irish declined to embrace

neutrality formally, but reaffirmed the policies which had guided
155 Keatinge, "Neutrality inside EPC," p. 144.
156 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 90.
157 Salmon, "Ireland:

A Neutral in the Community?" p. 205.
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The 1981 change of government in Ireland from Fianna Fail to
Fine Gael also provoked a debate on neutrality.

The former mini

ster, Brian Lenihan, accused the incoming Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Dr. James Dooge, of being ready to sacrifice neutrality
for the sake of European integration.

Dooge exchanged recrimi

nations, with the help of his Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald, who
noted that Lenihan had done an admirable job of confusing the
distinction between security and defense during an EEC meeting
at Venlo.159

Ironically, the uproar at the mere suggestion that

either party, Fianna Fail or Fine Gael, might be on the path to
abandoning neutrality, underlined the political importance of the
concept.

Both parties wanted to assume the title of neutrality's

protector.
Dooge, in an effort to dispel doubts over his steadfastness
to neutrality, reminded the Community that political cooperation
within the Community would have to be delineated from NATO
policy.

He also directed his aides not to participate in Com

munity meetings which raised defense questions, and forbade Irish
signatures on Community communiques which concerned defense
issues.160
Still, separating valid Community security issues from de
fense issues was a difficult task.
158 Salmon, "Ireland:

A

The Irish had been part of a

Neutral in the Community?," p. 205.

159 Keatinge, A Singular
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solid Community front at the CSCE in Helsinki and its subsequent
review meetings.

Moreover, the Irish had participated as a

Community member not as a neutral or non-aligned nation, as did
the other Continental neutrals who are not members of the
Community.161

The Irish also accepted Community funding of heli

copters, frigates and corvettes to patrol their coastal
waters.162

Patrolling the coastal waters of Ireland with Com

munity funded vessels was viewed as security, rather than
defense, cooperation on the grounds that Ireland was attempting
to protect the economic integrity of her waters and the vessels
had few offensive capabilities.
While the argument over security vs. defense issues prompted
both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael to reassert their commitments to
military neutrality, the Irish Labour party went even further.
Labour's support of neutrality may be said to have historical
roots older than those of either Fianna Fail or Fine Gael.

James

Connelly's opposition to Irish participation in World War I, and
the 1919 International Labour Conference espousal of neutrality,
demonstrate these roots.163

Subsequently, the party adopted a

fundamental, or ordinary neutrality, as observed by the
Continental neutrals, as part of its manifesto in March 1981, and
it pledged to work neutrality into the Irish Constitution if the

161 Salmon,

"Ireland: A Neutral
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chance presented itself.164

A small chance did occur with

Labour's participation in the Fine Gael coalition formed in 1981,
but the new Minister of Defense, Paddy Cooney considered funda
mental neutrality one of Labour's "loonier shrines" and declined
to embrace the idea.165
However, the Irish continued to practice the same type of
neutral, mediatory role in the United Nations as they had before
their membership in the Community.

From 1979-83, they partici

pated in United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, while
declining participation in efforts by Community member states to
duplicate such action.

Just as the Irish had earlier demon

strated in their opposition to Community forces in the Sinai,
they were committed to the United Nations as the proper agency to
undertake security measures because the United Nations was not
tainted with the stigma of a specific power bloc.
The Irish found themselves in the unaccustomed place of a
seat on the UN Security Council from 1981-82.

By coincidence, it

was in this period that the Falklands crisis erupted.

However,

the Falklands crisis, lasting from April to June 1982, proved how
valuable neutrality was as a state value, and how muddled
neutrality could be as a state policy.166
The initial Irish response to the seizure of the Falklands
by Argentina was to back UN resolution 502 condemning Argentine
164 Keatinge,

A Singular Stance,

p. 102.

165 Keatinge,

A Singular Stance,

p. 105.

166 Keatinge,

A Singular Stance,

p. 105.
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aggression.

However, Ireland's UN Ambassador, Dorr, felt there

still existed some ambiguity as to the legal title to the
Falklands.167

Argentina was wrong to use force but its legal

argument might have some validity.
The British response to the seizure of the islands was
military, represented by an armada.

After a naval confrontation

resulted in the sinking of the Argentine battleship, General
Belgrano, Ireland was placed in a difficult situation.

During

the conflict, the Irish had participated in the British sponsored
Community boycott of Argentina, but the sinking of the Belgrano
prompted the Haughey government to change direction and declare
that they would not be bound to observe Community sanctions,
because of Ireland's traditional policy of neutrality.168
While Haughey did repudiate Defense Minister Paddy Power's
assertion that the British were the aggressors, his action was
aimed at putting pressure on Britain by breaking Community ranks.
The Italians followed the Irish in protest, and on 4 May 1982,
these two countries supported a motion to end Community economic
sanctions against Argentina.169

Though this gambit failed, the

British could hardly have been pleased by this show of Community
non-solidarity.
Haughey continued to defend his position from attacks by
167 MacQueen, p. 42.
168 Fisk, p. 478.
169 MacQueen, p. 46.
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opposition leader FitzGerald, who claimed that Haughey's embrace
of neutrality in the crisis was belated, and by the British, who
stressed the obligations of Community membership and the impor
tance of solidarity.170
Both Taoiseach Haughey and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Gerry Collins, began stressing the importance of the U.N. in
resolving issues of this sort.

Of course, any U.N. role in the

crisis would guarantee a large measure of Irish participation by
dint

of their seaton theSecurity Council.171 Haughey

in the Irish Times on 7 May

asserted

1982, "Our options are much more

limited than anyone elses (in the EEC).

As a neutral nation that

has always refrained from military alliances of any kind, we have
to take a very clear view of any action, economic or otherwise,
that would appear supportive of military action.

Sanctions

complementing military action are not acceptable to us as a
neutral country.172

However, as FitzGerald pointed out, Haughey

had participated fully in the Community sanctions for a time and
was now using his noncompliance with sanctions to spur British
movement on agricultural subsidies within the Community which
would benefit Ireland.173

If this was true, Haughey's remark in

the Irish Times was not very accurate.
Nonetheless, the Irish and Italians continued to support
170 MacQueen, p. 48.
171 MacQueen, p. 43.
172 MacQueen, p. 47.
173 MacQueen, p. 47.
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anti-renewal measures within the Community until 17 May 1982.
The Irish then ceased participating in the Community debates and
focused solely on efforts in the U.N.

On 21 May 1982, the day

the British forces landed on San Carlos to regain possession of
the Falklands, UN Ambassador Dorr called for the cessation of
hostilities and the deployment of a UN observer force to prevent
the possibility of the conflict becoming much larger.

Pre

dictably, this idea was vetoed by both Britain and France in the
UN Security Council.174
Irish behavior in the crisis did not provoke the Haughey
government into leaving the Community.

The economic advantages

of membership outweighed any other considerations, but the Irish
had shown that their independence in foreign policy was not
encumbered by Community membership.

Thus, while Ireland's

neutrality might prove nettlesome to, it would not be threatened
by, the Community.
Therefore, in Ireland neutrality declined as a political
issue, although the structure of Irish neutrality was debated.
For example, a neutral must be able to defend itself and should
have an adequate defense force for this purpose.

Recently, the

Irish had been spending less on defense, on a per capita basis,
than any other neutral or NATO country in Europe, including such
minimal spenders as Portugal, Greece and Switzerland.175
174 MacQueen, p. 51.
175 Salmon, "The Changing Nature of Irish Defense Policy,"
p. 467.
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In 1982, UN Ambassador Dorr called for a worldwide reduction in
conventional forces, arguing that Ireland's defense forces were
already at a level acceptable to a disarmed world, but in 1983,
Fine Gael Minister of Defense, Paddy Cooney, suggested that
Ireland could confidently rely on NATO if it were attacked by
forces hostile to the West.176,177
A firm commitment to military neutrality was consistent with
a weak army, because of Ireland's relatively unimportant
strategic position.

In an age of intercontinental ballistic

missiles, Great Britain was no longer a bulwark of the West and
this reduced the likelihood that Ireland would be used as a base
of attack.

Furthermore, missile technology has made conventional

perceptions of territorial transgression of a neutral's integrity
somewhat obsolete.
Ireland's current defense forces can best be classified as a
gendarmie.178

It has almost no offensive capability.

Its main

roles are serving in UN peacekeeping operations and controlling
domestic political terrorism, for example, by patrolling the
border with Northern Ireland.

It has no jet fighters or bombers

and its air force is largely restricted to prop driven recon
naissance and ground support planes.179

The helicopters, fri

gates and corvettes of the navy are used for patrolling Ireland's
176

Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 119.

177

Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 73.
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Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 69.

179

Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 68.
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200 mile coastal waters.
capability.

There is little armour or anti-aircraft

Thus Ireland is constrained by its peculiar armed

forces to a military neutrality in which its fate is left up to
Western benevolence and its own strategic insignificance.
Though Ireland may not possess the capability to repel an
aggressor, inroads or weaknesses in the political attractiveness
of neutrality have not been apparent.

The New Ireland Forum of

30 May 1983 brought agreement between Dick Spring of Labour,
Charles Haughey of Fianna Fail, and Garret FitzGerald of Fine
Gael, that a united Ireland would remain neutral.180
In 1987, the Single European Act, a modification of
Genscher-Colombo which omitted references to NATO or military
security, was confirmed in a referendum by the Irish
electorate.181

Thus, Ireland became the last of the twelve

European Economic Community member states to accept a package of
political and economic measures which give concreteness to the
"Solemn Declaration on European Union" referred to by the Act.
Though this strengthens the possibilities for further political
and economic coordination within the Community, the doubts of
1981 about the viability of neutrality were largely absent in
Ireland.

The Irish now presented a united front on the non

negotiability of Ireland's neutrality.

The policy was no longer

merely a useful expedient, subject to future review.

It was

firmly established policy.
180 Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 83.
181 The Christian Science Monitor. 28 May 1987, p. 2.
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In the analysis of the factors of constraint on Irish
neutrality from the mid-1970's to the present, the most important
factor has been the popularity of neutrality in Irish domestic
politics.

The Dail debates on Professor Dooge's appointment as

foreign minister, and the debates dealing with Haughey's handling
of the Falkland*s crisis, demonstrated how powerful a force neu
trality had become politically.

Neither Fianna Fail nor Fine

Gael was willing to be characterized as less than rock solid in
its support of a militarily neutral Ireland.

The exact practice

or consistency of Irish neutrality could be questioned.

The Fine

Gael Minister of Defense, Paddy Power, and Fianna Fail Taoiseach,
Charles Haughey, both made statements which seemed to waver on
this point, but when pressed, neither of the two largest parties
would lessen its hold on neutrality as a state symbol.

It had

become too important politically.
The domestic political framework was solidifying in support
of some type of non-negotiable neutrality.

No longer did

politicians make remarks like Lemass did in the 1960*s, hinting
at joining NATO in return for entrance into the Community, or as
a quid pro quo for the reunification of the island.

The Irish

were now in the Community and their neutrality was not seriously
questioned by other Community members.

The New Ireland Forum

also brought agreement among the leaders of the South that an
eventually united Ireland would, and should, remain neutral.
If anything, the most contentious force in the domestic
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political debate was the Irish Labour Party*s attachment to a
more rigorous neutrality than that embraced by Fianna Fail or
Fine Gael.

While this may cause some difficulty for future Fine

Gael-Labour coalitions, it certainly will do nothing but
strengthen the tendency of the Irish political leadership to
identify with neutrality.

The population, in fact, seemed not at

all threatened by suggestions that the Single European Act might
put Ireland*s neutrality at risk.

They endorsed the referendum

and brought Ireland into line with the rest of the Community.
Only a populace solidly attached to neutrality would have taken
this step, one that theoretically limits the scope of Irish
neutrality by providing for further European coordination.
The need to assert Irish sovereignty is linked to the
prospects of further European integration.

The Irish could join

the Community and vote for further European integration because
neither of these steps immediately threatened the use of neu
trality as a symbol of Irish independence.

Indeed, Ireland has

broken with the Community ranks in the boycott of Argentina, has
supported the right of the Palestinians to a homeland, has sup
ported sanctions against Namibia and South Africa, and has gennerally voted a progressive line in the UN with regard to selfdetermination and economic development in the Third World.

The

Irish continue to formulate answers to questions based on the
merits of each case, as they see them. By remaining neutral, they
do not have to temper their views to one power bloc or the other.
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The distribution of power, the last factor to consider, had
not radically changed during the previous twenty five years.

The

Irish were still situated in a British and American lake and are
still heavily integrated into the British economy.

They have

felt so integrated into the Western zone of influence that they
have largely abandoned the thought of a credible military
defense.

Likewise, they are firmly indebted to the West in

matters of trade and economic survival.

If not for Great

Britain and the rest of the Community, the Irish economy would be
even weaker than it is today.

As a result, Ireland's neutrality

is benevolent to the West, and practically speaking, it is
constrained by the balance of power to this benevolence. Domestic
politics and maintenance of sovereignty have constrained the
Irish to a neutral course, but the distribution of power directs
this neutrality toward the West.
Ireland has used this orientation to facilitate dialogue
between the Western powers and parts of the world not normally
receptive to the West.

Thus, when the Community needed a

negotiator with the post-revolutionary Portuguese leadership, or
the Arab countries, it was Ireland which served this function.
So, while the distribution of power suggests that the Irish
should join the Western alliance, this need not occur as long as
Irish neutrality is directed toward fulfilling needs seen as non
threatening and beneficial to the West.
*

*

*

*

*
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Du ring the 1970s, Finland*s use of neutrality to promote an
image of accommodating both East and West had reached its maximum
effort.

The CSCE included the US and Canada only because the

Finns convinced the USSR that a conference without the two North
American nations would lessen the chances that the CSCE would be
viewed as contributing to detente.182

The Soviet-Finnish Treaty

of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) was
renewed, but the Finns refrained from criticizing the US for its
actions in Vietnam.

In 1973 the two Germanies were simultaneous

ly recognized by Finland, promoting diplomatic links among the
three states, other than trade missions, for the first time since
World War II.183

In exchange for recognition, both East and West

Germany promised to respect Finnish neutrality and gave the Finns
pledges of nonaggression.184
While Kekkonen occupied the presidency, the government was
composed of varying Center-Left coalitions which largely left
foreign policy in the president's hands.

Kekkonen continued to

commit forces to UN efforts, with Finns in Cyprus until 1977 and
in Lebanon starting in 1979.

He also continued to use the UN as

a forum for advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons, an issue
he raised extensively in 1978.18^

182 Faloon, p. 8.
183 Faloon, p. 8.
184 Faloon, p. 8.
185 Vayrynen, p. 148.

-74-

The late 1970s and early 1980s ended the period of detente
between the Superpowers, but Kekkonen continued to refrain from
committing himself to either side in East-West conflict.

Com

munist aggression in Kampuchea in 1979, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1980, and the declaration of martial law in Poland
did not illicit a Finnish response.

However, the invasion of the

US embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage taking, not EastWest issues, did provoke condemnation by Kekkonen.186

The Finns

also took no sides by participating in both the 1980 Olympics in
Moscow and the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.
In 1981-2 a power struggle took place in Finland to deter
mine the successor to President Kekkonen.

The electoral college

was a reflection of party strength and it was assumed that, as
the largest part, the Social Democrats could virtually pick the
next president at a party caucus.

But they could not unify for

this event and one faction, allied with the Agrarians and the
Communists, received the important endorsement of President
Kekkonen.

The Social Democrat candidate favoured by Kekkonen,

and subsequently elected by the electoral college, was Mauno
Koivisto, one of the Social Democrats opposed to the Tannerites
and the Honka front in 1961.

In 1966 he was in the cabinet of

the first, Soviet endorsed, Social Democratic government of
Finland.

In 1968 he became Prime Minister, and his experience

186 Jaako Blomberg, "Finlandfs Policy of Neutrality in Times
of Detente and Tension," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign
Policy (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1985) p. 3.
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also included a term on the board of governors of the Bank of
Finland.187
Koivisto would finally enable a representative of the
largest party to serve in the highest office.

He was the choice

of Kekkonen and was known and trusted by Moscow.

He was well

prepared, having played a number of roles in different Finnish
coalitions, and was a vocal supporter of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen
line that had facilitated Finland*s continued existence as a
sovereign state.
Early in Koivisto*s tenure, however, it became apparent that
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was undergoing some modification.

In

1984, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paavo Vayrynen, asserted that
the line was no longer to be interpreted as treating both the
East and the West in a symmetrical fashion.

Vayrynen was aware

that Finland*s propinquity to the Soviet Union meant that, if the
Soviets wished, Finland*s sovereignty could be endangered.

He

was also aware that the new Social Democratic leadership had not
accumulated the trust that the Kremlin had for Kekkonen.

Because

of strategic reality and the infancy of their tenure, therefore,
Vayrynen believed the Social Democratic government would have to
give the Soviet Union more sympathetic consideration, than had
their predecessor.188
187 Lauri Haataja, "The President’s Image and His
Selection," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy.
pp. 48-50.
188 Steve Lindberg, "Are We Counting our Chickens?"
in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, p. 9.
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Some examples of criticism aimed at the West by Finland
demonstrate this point.

Israel was severely rebuked by Finland

for its invasion of Lebanon and the idea of a Palestinian
homeland was supported.

The US intervention in Grenada during

the collapse of the Bishop regime and the NEW JEWEL movement also
brought Finnish condemnation.

Finally, Reagan*s aggressive

tactics against the Sandinistas have brought Finnish
displeasure.189
In 1983, the same year that the US intervention in Grenada
was condemned in Helsinki, the Finns extended the terra of the
FCMA, echoing the process of 1955 and 1970.190

While the FCMA

reduced tensions to Finland's east, an attempt by Koivisto and
Vayrynen to line up support for a Nordic Nuclear Free Weapons
Zone (NFWZ) failed.

Finland's accommodation of the Soviet

Union's security interests was not shared by the rest of
Scandinavia.

For example, the deployment of cruise missiles and

Pershing IIs to counter the Soviet INF buildup was not criticized
in Scandinavia, except by Finland.191

The Swedes had been vexed

by the outstanding matter of Soviet submarines, in all likelihood
carrying nuclear weapons, stranding themselves in Swedish waters.
Norway and Denmark, as signatories of NATO, simply could not
189 Blomberg, p. 3.
190 "Chronology of Events," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish
Foreign Policy (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1986)
p. 52.
191 Mauno Koivisto, "The New Year Address of the President
of the Republic," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy^.
p. 55.
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formalize their adherence to the NFWZ, and there existed in the
two countries a great deal more scepticism regarding Soviet
motives than there was in Finland.192

Nonetheless, Foreign

Minister Vayrynen continued to press the idea.

As recently as

1985, at the review meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
Geneva, he continued to assert the practicality and usefulness of
nuclear free regions in the promotion of non-proliferation and
disarmament.

He also used this forum to call for more progress

in the US-USSR INF negotiations.193
1985 was also the year during which the Finns had a hostage
crisis of their own in the Middle East.

They had previously

condemned the Israeli bombardment of PLO headquarters in Tunis,
as well as the Israeli presence in Lebanon generally and now
found themselves at the mercy of Israeli proxies.

The South

Lebanese Army took hostage twenty four Finnish soldiers serving
with the UN.194

The soldiers were eventually returned, with

Israeli assistance, and the Finnish government kept lines open in
Jerusalem throughout the matter.

These communication links with

the Israeli leadership would again prove valuable in 1987, during

192 "Chronology of Events," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish
Foreign Policy, p. 63.
193 Paavo Vayrynen, "Statement by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Paavo Vayrynen, at the 3d Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, p. 65.
194 "Chronology of Events," 1985 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign
Policy, p. 52.
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a Soviet visit to Jerusalem.195

The Soviet Union, which had

broken ties with Israel, was forced to use the good offices of
Finland.

In effect, the Soviets operated out of the Finnish

embassy.
During Koivisto's presidency there has also been an in
creased attempt to further integrate Soviet and Finnish economic
needs.

The level of Finnish-Soviet trade had decreased somewhat

late in Kekkonen's final term.

The Finns had actively partici

pated in EFTA-EEC agreements in 1977 at Vienna, and in 1984 in
Luxembourg.196

The levels of Finnish trade directed toward the

East and the West were not symmetrical.

The bulk of Finnish

trade was, and still is, with Western nations.197

However, at

the start of a new five year agreement in 1986 with the Soviet
Union, which was intended to increase Finnish-Soviet trade, the
Finnish leadership noted that bilateral trade between the Soviet
Union and Finland was expanding.

From 1976-80, the Soviet Union

accounted for 18.6% of Finnish trade.
in the years of 1981-5.

That figure rose to 23.4%

But Finnish trade with NATO signatories

still accounted for over 50% of Finland's trade income.198

The

attempt to develop parity in trade with both East and West
195 The Associated Press, in The Daily Press, Newport News,
Virginia, 21 July 1987, p. 8.
3.96 Erkki Maentakanen, "Free Trade in Western Europe," in
1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, pp. 36-37.
197 Urpo Kivikari, "Finnish Soviet Economic Relations:
A
Special Case of East-West Trade," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish
Foreign Policy, p. 24.
198 Ibid., p. 24.
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is clearly not practical, but Finland aims to have a healthy
trade with both power blocs so that the prosperity of its Western
oriented economy is realized without provoking Soviet anxieties.
Trade has been used, therefore, to muffle Soviet concerns
about Finland becoming too deeply integrated with the West.

The

Finns and the Soviets worked together, for example, to develop
nuclear power plants in Finland.

In 1985 the Finns signed a gas

supply agreement with the Soviet Union which calls for joint
development of the pipeline to the Soviet source and will supply
Finland's energy needs through 2008.199

The Finns also continued

to buy the main Soviet battle tank for their armed forces, the
T—72.

Developing trade in sensitive items such as nuclear power

and the procurement of weapons ensures that trade links are
assured in the future.

Furthermore, the Joint Finnish-Soviet

Commission for Economic cooperation acts as an offshoot of the
FCMA to forestall Soviet fears of a Western economic takeover in
Finland by promoting economic links and joint projects between
Finland and the USSR.200

Finnish cooperation with the Soviets in

the procurement of supplies for its army, development of nuclear
power, and the pipeline project were coordinated by this com
mission.

A recient project of the commission foresees the

199 "Chronology of Events," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish
Foreign Policy." p. 54.
200 Ake Wihtol, "Some Views on the Present and Future
Economic Relations between Finland and the Soviet Union," in
1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, p. 34.
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development of a $350 million dollar coal plant in
Phillipines.201
parties.

Such ventures garner dividends for both

The Soviets acquire much needed Western currency and

the Finns strengthen their credibility in the Kremlin.
The emphasis placed on trade between the Soviet Union and
Finland appears to have been strengthened during the Koivisto
presidency, and this would seem to be a corrolary of the Vayrynen
assertion that Finland's neutrality is nonsymmetrical.
To review the factors influencing Finnish neutrality during
this time period, the starting point will be the tug and pull of
domestic politics.

For the first time since 1956, Finland had a

new man in the presidency.

Koivisto was selected because he was

a Social Democrat who appealed to both the Communists and the
Agrarians.

This was due to his pledge to continue the Paasikivi-

Kekkonen line and his non-Tannerite past.

But with mainly Social

Democratic advisors, the emphasis on detachment from East-West
competition that Kekkonen initiated was dropped.

And it was

perhaps the need the Social Democrats felt to develop Soviet
trust in the Koivisto presidency that led to the more accommo
dating pose sculpted by Koivisto and Vayrynen.
The loss of Kekkonen meant that the forces of domestic
politics would have less power to constrain Finnish neutrality.
The last years of Kekkonen's presidency were not politically

201 Richard J. Kessler, "Are the Soviets Sneaking up on the
Phillipines?" in the Washington Post. 26 July 1987, p. Bl.
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content ious , as his 80% reelection figure in 1980 would indicate,
but his seat above the political fray also enabled him to formu
late a foreign policy which was less accommodating to the Soviet
Union.

He had developed the personal trust of the Kremlin, and

as a result, his initiatives did not become political issues in
Finland.

The election of Koivisto merely signalled a return to

the days of the earlier Paasikivi and Kekkonen presidencies that
were more accommodating toward Soviet interests than was the
later portion of Kekkonen1s tenure.
The need to maintain sovereignty and state integrity con
strained Finland's brand of neutrality less than in earlier
periods.

The long stay in office by Kekkonen had dispelled

Soviet doubts over Finnish intentions, and Soviet absorption of
Finland was now out of the question.

The main force of state

sovereignty, and the assertion of that sovereignty, was expressed
in Finland's role as a mediator.

By developing Helsinki's image

as a neutral site in which East-West conferences could be held,
dialogue promoted and treaties signed, Finland's neutral image
gained credibility and the state found a secure outlet for the
expression of its sovereignty.
Finally, the distribution of power continued to be the
dominant consideration in the practice of Finnish neutrality.
The Finns could not integrate too closely into the West for fear
of provoking Soviet paranoia.

Instead the Finns found that, even

in foreign trade, they would have to adapt economic priorities to
fit their attempt to stay out of great power competition.

The
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natural orientation of Finland's economic system favoured trade
with the West.

The proximity of the USSR and the Soviet need for

Western technology, which was obtainable through Finland,
promoted trade to the East.

By exchanging manufactured goods for

Soviet raw materials such as gas and oil, the Finns achieved the
most balanced East-West trade portfolio in Europe.
Likewise the Soviet military presence promoted a certain
blindness in Finnish neutrality.

The Finns simply did not act as

if they saw Soviet power being exerted in Afghanistan, or
indirectly in Poland, and their silence on these matters was the
result.

On the otherhand, the silence which had greeted Western

imperialism in Kekkonen's last years was also over.

The West,

specifically the US, was chastised for its involvement in the
Caribbean, and Central America, and for its intransigence in the
US—USSR INF talks.

*

Conclusions

*

The historical review of Finnish and Irish neutrality is now
complete and it is necessary to compare the forces of constraint
which moulded Irish and Finnish neutrality, bringing out the
similarities and explaining the contrasts.

For as the con

straints differed in intensity, so did the development of the two
neutralities.
Presently, in both Ireland and Finland, there is a consensus
among the political parties that, for political purposes, neu
trality is too valuable a policy to neglect.

But in both coun

tries, there exists disagreement over the type of neutrality that
should be practiced, making the formulation of neutrality a some
what contentious issue at election time.
In Ireland, the Labour Party is the strongest proponent of a
complete or fundamental neutrality.

This is, Labour proposes to

institutionalize neutrality by introducing an amendment to the
constitution which stipulates that Ireland be a neutral country,
politically, militarily and in all other forms of international
intercourse.

While this type of arrangement has proved feasible

on the Continent, for example the Swiss are constitutionally
bound to neutrality, it has not moved much beyond the circle of
Labour proponents in Ireland.

But Labour is the third largest

party in Ireland and its importance as a possible coalition
partner makes it difficult to imagine any government advancing a
policy which would lead to a reduction in scope of the military
neutrality already in place.
The Fianna Fail and Fine Gael parties espouse a military
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neutrality, the principles of which were developed by Eamon de
Valera in World War II.

Though officials in Fine Gael and Fianna

Fail have alluded to Ireland's natural affinity for the West, and
Ireland's concomitant responsibility to the Western powers if
they are attacked by the Soviet bloc, neither party has seriously
considered joining NATO.

There is a recognition that military

neutrality is too valuable a political weapon not to be used, and
as shown during the Falkland's crisis, each major party will, if
pushed, claim to be more neutral than the other.
In Finland there is also a recognition that neutrality is
immensely popular with the public, and is therefore not to be
abandoned by any party which wishes to remain in office.

The

Agrarian party, whose members have included Kekkonen and
Paasikivi, is the original architect of what is known as the
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

This is the policy of declaring Finland

neutral, accommodating Soviet security interests, attempting to
de-militarize Scandinavia, and developing Finland's role as a
mediator.
The second largest party, the Communists, favor a stronger
link to the Soviet Union than is represented by the PaasikiviKekkonen line, but have been willing to compromise party
principle to serve in Center-Left coalitions.

However, willing

ness to compromise party principles has come late to the largest
party, the Social Democrats.

For much of the post-War period,

this party was not politically successful.

It had trouble, for

example, forming stable governments in the Finnish parliament
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because of its non-acceptance of a corollary to the PaasikiviKekkonen line.

Because Soviet security interests must be taken

into account in formulating Finnish foreign policy, it is
essential that the leaders of Finland have some credibility in
the Kremlin.

This was recognized by Paasikivi and Kekkonen, but

the Tannerite leadership of the Social Democrats lacked this
credibility, and as a result Social Democratic governments led by
Fagerholm in 1948 and 1958, and the 1961 Honka front, were
ultimately failures.

Only after the Social Democrats embraced

the "personal corollary" of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was
stability introduced into Finnish neutrality, the product of
Soviet trust, and was political success granted to the Social
Democrats.
The need to maintain and assert state sovereignty as a cause
of neutrality is evident in both Ireland and Finland.

In

Ireland, neutrality was practiced by de Valera in World War II
for just such a purpose.

He need to provide a working policy

behind which the population would unite, and at the same time
distance himself from Great Britain.

Neutrality was, and is, a

means to delineate Irish independence from the United Kingdom.
Unlike Ireland, Finland was unable to assert complete state
sovereignty through neutrality until the Soviet evacuation of
Porkalla in 1956.

Though Finland's assertion of state

sovereignty has been of a shorter tenure than Ireland's neu
trality has played just as big a role in its independence from
the Soviet Union.

Finland resisted attempts by the Soviets to be
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dr awn into the communist orbit and was the only country to say no
when asked to join the Warsaw Pact.
In both Finland and Ireland, the declaration and practice of
neutrality has facilitated independence, but the same policy has
also facilitated mediatory actions which are embraced by the
political framework, and are used to establish an international
identity and gain credibility for neutrality with a wider
audience.

The progressive voting behavior of Ireland in the

Community and the United Nations and its participation in UN
peacekeeping efforts, have carved out an independent Ireland,
separate from Great Britain.

Likewise, because of Finnish

participation in the NNA and their hosting of the CSCE, the Finns
are recognized as a separate, neutral country, and not a Soviet
pawn.
The distribution of power has been more of a force in
Finland than in Ireland, with regard to constraining the policy
choices available to the leadership.

Given the proximity of the

Soviet Union, Finland must not be a threat to the USSR if it
wishes to remain an independent Western oriented state.

The

solution worked out by Paasikivi and Kekkonen was the FCMA.

This

document guarantees both Soviet security and Finnish neutrality
by recognizing that as soon as one is compromised so is the
other.

For example, as long as the West acts nonaggressively

towards Finnish territory, the Soviet Union will be content to
respect Finnish neutrality.

If the West were to roll through the

North and threaten Finland's territory, Finnish neutrality would
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be finished as a policy able to reconcile Finnish interests in
the current distribution of power.

The Finns are cognizant of

this and work for the demilitarization of the North with such
proposals as the NFWZ and a Scandinavian neutrality.
The Irish, because they lie in an American and British zone
of interest are, for reasons other than a common political and
cultural heritage, constrained to a benevolence towards the West.
But the West would not be likely to threaten Irish territory if
Ireland were to end this benevolence.

The distribution of

economic power also constrains Ireland to something less than an
economic and military matters in the same light in its practice
of neutrality.

However, the Irish are not actually threatened by

NATO power and, in large part, depend upon it for protection.
The Irish are clearly neither economically nor politically
neutral, as are the Finns.

As a member of the Community, Ireland

is constrained to remain a member of that political and economic
alliance even in time of war, and to take part in Community
sanctions aimed against a common aggressor.

However, the distri

bution of economic power has had a far greater effect in
modifying Ireland's neutrality than it has had on the Finns.
Finland, unlike Ireland, has been able to achieve a balanced
trade portfolio with both East and West.

The Finns are not

members of any overtly political economic organization.

Instead,

they cooperate with the Community, EFTA, and CMEA in a manner
that demarcates Finnish participation from Finnish membership.
This type of evenhandedness, and awareness of the effect of
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economic policy on the credibility of neutrality, is not a recent
occurrence in Finland.

By accepting German war material in World

War II, the Finns were punished by the Soviet Union when they
sued for peace.

The next time a decision involved aid from a

bloc opposed to the Soviets, the Marshall Aid package, the Finns
elected to turn it down.

A precedent dictating neutrality in the

economic sphere was set and has been adhered to since.
Both Finland and Ireland illustrate the impracticality of
sustaining a rigid neutrality.

In Ireland there is not a

political consensus among the parties to adhere to a complete
neutrality shorn of consideration for Western interests.

Cer

tainly Ireland's heritage and its political and economic organi
zation, define it as Western.

Its need to remain economically

viable dictates that it participate in the Community, and this,
accordingly, colors its neutrality.

The geographic situation of

Ireland and its woeful defense forces also obligate it to the
West.

But Ireland, if it wishes to fulfill its yearning for an

identity separate from Great Britain, cannot take the final step
of joining the Western Alliance and fully integrate itself into
those states which form the Western power bloc.

Neutrality

affords Ireland an identity, though it is incomplete.

But given

the factors which support it, which include culture, its domestic
political efficacy, and its need to assert sovereignty, Irish
neutrality will only be colored by the need to accommodate the
distribution of power, not be abandoned.
The Finns are also predisposed, because of the domestic
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political balance, and the need to assert sovereignty, to
continue their neutral policy.

The distribution of power is

accommodated in Finland's case by the FCMA.

This treaty colors

Finnish neutrality, as Community membership does Irish
neutrality, because of its ramifications in time of war.

But it

does allow for a neutrality that has lasted since the end of
World War II because it calls for modifications in Finnish
neutrality and the accommodation of Soviet security interests,
and adjusts to the strategic balance Finland occupies.
Finnish and Irish neutrality are both imperfect.

While one

pays obeisance to the East, the other takes full advantage of the
economic wealth of the West, while declining a defense role.

In

both countries there is wide public support for continuing the
present foreign policy.

Neutrality is popular in both Ireland

and Finland because it is modified to fulfill the needs of their
political leaders and populace, and guarantees the sovereignty of
each state.

As a state value and state policy, neutrality has

flourished in Ireland and Finland, but the incompleteness or
imperfections of each states' neutrality policy, its willingness
to compromise to accommodate domestic and foreign interests, has
benefited rather than hindered its survival.
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